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DOMESTIC VIOLENCE MATTERS: THE CASE FOR




A conventional reading of United States Supreme Court rulings on the right to
counsel in civil cases would lead to the conclusion that petitioners in protective
order proceedings would have no right to appointed counsel.1  This article
challenges this view and demonstrates that Supreme Court jurisprudence supports
the conclusion that due process requires that victims of domestic violence be
afforded the benefit of appointed counsel.
The adversarial system functions on the premise that both sides have
competent representation. 2 In a majority of protective order proceedings, however,
neither party has legal representation.' Some commentators have argued for the
recognition of a right to appointed counsel for civil defendants, arguing that the
* Clinical Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. I would like to thank the
Philadelphia Area Law School Consortium for organizing the 23rd Annual Edward V. Sparer
Symposium on Civil Gideon: Making the Case. I am grateful to Mary Louise Fellows for her
willingness to read drafts and her always valuable insights. I also thank Mary Rumsey of the University
of Minnesota Law Library for her help and research assistants Sara Youn and Edith-Nicole Cameron.
1. See Bruce A. Boyer, Justice, Access to the Courts, and the Right to free Counsel for Indigent
Parents: The Continuing Scourge of Lassiter v. Department of Social Services of Durham, 36 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 363, 365 (2005) (acknowledging there is no per se right to counsel in civil cases but urging
reconsideration of Supreme Court jurisprudence that limits indigents' access to counsel); William L.
Dick, Jr., The Right to Appointed Counselfor Indigent Civil Litigants: The Demands of Due Process, 30
WM. & MARY L. REv. 627, 628 (1989) (explaining that the Supreme Court created a presumption
against requiring appointed counsel when a litigant cannot be deprived of personal liberty in civil
matters) (citing Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 26-27 (1981)); Lisa E. Martin,
Providing Equal Justice for the Domestic Violence Victim: Due Process and the Victim's Right to
Counsel, 34 GONZ. L. REv. 329, 330 (1998) (recognizing there is no right to counsel for domestic
violence victims and suggesting the time has come for a constitutionally mandated due process right to
counsel).
2. See Russell Engler, And Justice for All - Including the Unrepresented Poor: Revisiting the
Roles of Judges, Mediators, and Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 1987, 2022 (1999) (suggesting that the
adversarial system relies on the premise that both sides will be represented); Todd Macfarlane, Note,
Mallard v. United States District Court: Without Imposing Compulsory Service, How Can the Legal
Profession Meet Indigents' Pressing Needs for Legal Representation?, 1990 UTAH L. REv. 923, 926
(1990) ("[Olur adversary system of justice works best when both sides are zealously and competently
represented.") (citing McKeever v. Israel, 689 F.2d 1315,1323 (7th Cir. 1982)).
3. Priya Outar, 2004 Watch OFP Report 2-3,
http://www.watchmn.org/pdfs(WATCHOFPReport.pdf.
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position of defendants makes them more vulnerable. 4 It is the victim of violence,
however, usually a female petitioner, who is more vulnerable than her abuser, the
respondent/defendant. 5 The abuser has constrained the petitioner's physical liberty
and ignored her autonomy by exercising his power through physical violence. 6
This article addresses the right to counsel in the most common civil protective
order proceeding and for the most at-risk victim of domestic violence: a woman
petitioning for protection from abuse against her intimate male partner.7  If
petitioners were found to have a right to appointed counsel, it is likely that the
appointment of counsel for indigent defendant/respondents would follow.
State action is a prerequisite to the application of Fourteenth Amendment due
process constraints in civil cases.8  This article demonstrates why courts should
conclude that state action is present in protective order proceedings, even though
these actions are brought by private parties. Once state action is established, the
question becomes what process is due.
In any discussion of Civil Gideon, the touchstone case, and some would say
the primary obstacle to finding a constitutional right to counsel for indigent parties,
is Lassiter v. Department of Social Services.9 In Lassiter the United States
Supreme Court held that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does
not require an absolute right to appointed counsel in civil matters.'0 When physical
liberty is at stake, it raised a presumption for the appointment of counsel.1 ' In the
absence of the risk of loss of physical liberty, in order to determine what process is
due, the Court relied on the balancing test set out in Mathews v. Eldridge,2 which
requires evaluating the private interest at stake, the government interest, and the
4. See Simran Bindra & Pedram Ben-Cohen, Public Civil Defenders: A Right to Counsel for
Indigent Civil Defendants, 10 GEO J. ON POVERTY & POL'Y 1, 2 (2003) (claiming that an indigent
defendant is particularly vulnerable because he is brought into court against his will and there are fewer
incentives for lawyers to represent defendants); Rachel Kleinman, Housing Gideon: The Right to
Counsel in Eviction Cases, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1507, 1529 (2004) (arguing that eviction of indigent
tenants may lead to increased homelessness, poverty and disenfranchisement, and that tenants who have
the assistance of legal counsel obtain better results in eviction proceedings than those who do not).
5. Bonita C. Meyersfeld, Reconceptualizing Domestic Violence in International Law, 67 ALB. L.
REV. 371 (2003).
6. Id.
7. See JENNIFER MEADE & ALLISON L. TASsiE, COMMW. OF MASS. GOVERNOR'S COMM'N ON
SEXUAL & DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, SUMMARIES OF STATEWIDE DATA SOURCES RELEVANT TO SEXUAL
AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, AND CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE (2005) (reporting that 82% of restraining orders
in Massachusetts are taken out against men, 94% of which are abuse prevention orders); Susan B.
Sorenson & Haikang Shen, Restraining Orders in California: A Look at Statewide Data, 11 VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN 912, 912 (2005) (reporting that 72.2% of California's 227,941 active restraining
orders in 2003 were filed by women with the purpose of restraining men); Betsy Tsai, Note, The Trend
Toward Specialized Domestic Violence Courts: Improvements on an Effective Innovation, 68 FORDAM
L. REV. 1285, 1292 (2000) (stating that a civil order for protection is "one of the most common
remedies" for women seeking protection against male batterers).
8. United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281, 298 (1920) (recognizing that the Fourteenth
Amendment is "directed alone against state action").
9. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
10. Id. at 33-35.
11. Id. at 26.
12. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
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risk of erroneous determination. 3 According to Lassiter, the three Mathews factors
are weighed "against the presumption that there is a right to appointed counsel only
where the indigent ... may lose his personal freedom."' 14
This article explains why both Lassiter and Mathews support the conclusion
that petitioners in domestic violence civil protective order cases have a right to
appointment of counsel. First, with respect to the Lassiter presumption, the
deprivation of physical liberty is at stake because of the risk of physical violence
that victims face. Second, even if the Lassiter presumption in favor of counsel
does not arise, application of the Mathews analysis leads to the conclusion that
indigent victims of domestic violence should have appointed counsel.
Part I of this article examines domestic violence in the United States -
examining both its pervasiveness and its characteristics. It also looks at the nature
of the creation of civil protective orders, their potential effectiveness, and why
victims of violence turn to the civil justice system for intervention. Part II
examines whether there is sufficient state action to prompt the application of the
due process clause to what appears to be a private cause of action between two
private parties. It argues that pursuant to the most recent test articulated by the
United States Supreme Court, there is sufficient state action to trigger constitutional
protections including the right to appointed counsel in protective order cases. Part
III briefly sets out the history of the constitutional right to counsel, first with
respect to criminal prosecutions, and then with respect to various civil proceedings.
It considers the U.S. Supreme Court's complex jurisprudence concerning the right
to counsel in civil matters and the difficulty of discerning a bright line rule that can
be applied to both right to counsel and fee waiver cases. Turning to the Mathews
factors and the presumption created by Lassiter, Part IV argues, first, that domestic
violence cases, by their nature, include the risk of deprivation of physical liberty
and therefore the Lassiter presumption for appointed counsel arises. Secondly, Part
IV shows that, even if the Lassiter presumption requiring loss of physical freedom
is not satisfied directly, in domestic violence cases courts should consider the
Mathews factors, including the private interest of regularizing familial relationships
by focusing on safety and the liberty interest of citizens to bodily integrity and
autonomy as well as the gendered nature of domestic violence and discrimination
against women in the court system that lead to a high likelihood of erroneous
determinations. The weight of these factors should trump the state's pecuniary
interest and favor appointed counsel for petitioners in domestic violence cases.
I. DoMEsTIC VIOLENCE
Domestic violence protective order cases bring before the court petitioners
who are faced with restrictions on their liberty and autonomy. Domestic violence
takes place within a context of inequality that forces its victims to constrain their
daily lives. The court, when hearing these cases, communicates a public message
as to how society views intimate partner violence and what is the appropriate
13. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 18.
14. Id. at 27.
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societal response. Civil protective orders play a critical role in the state's, and
therefore society's, willingness to intervene to protect victims of domestic violence.
A. Scope of the Problem
Domestic violence is pervasive in the United States. Approximately 4.8
million rapes and physical assaults are committed against American women by
their intimate partners annually and approximately 2.9 million assaults are
committed against American men annually by their intimate partners.1 5 Women
experience more intimate partner violence than do men.' 6  Additionally, the
violence that women experience is often part of emotionally abusive and
controlling behavior. 17 The physical violence against women by their intimate
partners is often part of a "systematic pattern of dominance and control." '
Research has found that women experience more repeated acts of physical violence
and are more often injured by the violence than men.' 9 In 2001, intimate partner
violence was twenty percent of all the non-fatal violent crime experienced by
women while intimate partners committed three percent of the non-fatal violent
crime experienced by men. 0
Common wisdom might suggest that the way to eliminate domestic violence is
to separate the victim from the abuser. "In fact, many, if not most women in
abusive relationships do eventually leave violent relationships."'2' However,
research shows that separation does not always stop the violence.22 The occurrence
of violence upon separation or attempts at separation is widely recognized and has
been termed separation assault.23 Separation from the abuser has been identified
"as an important risk factor for lethal violence and injury.' 24
As domestic violence emerged on the public scene as an important societal
issue, reform efforts addressed the role of the state in protecting victims and
holding abusers accountable for their violence.2 5  These efforts focused on
15. PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, EXTENT, NATURE, AND
CONSEQUENCES OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE, FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN SURVEY iii (2000), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles 1/nij/1 81867.pdf.
16. Id.
17. Id. at iv.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. CALLIE MARIE RENNISON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE,
1993-2001, CRIME DATA BRIEF, (Feb. 2003), available at
http:l/www.ojp.usdoj.govlbjs/pub/pdf/ipv0l.pdf.
21. T.K. Logan & Robert Walker, Separation as a Risk Factor for Victims of Intimate Partner
Violence: Beyond Lethality and Injury (A Response to Campbell), 19 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE
1478, 1478 (2004).
22. Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90
MICH. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1991).
23. Id. at 6.
24. Logan & Walker, supra note 21, at 1478.
25. See Barbara J. Hart, State Codes on Domestic Violence: Analysis, Commentary, and
Recommendations, 43 Juv. & FAav. CT. J. 1, 3 (1992) (discussing legal reform directed at ending
domestic violence and the development of laws protecting battered women in the United States since the
late 1970s).
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reforming both the civil and criminal justice systems,26 and have resulted in
numerous strategies and statutory changes. 27
In the realm of the criminal justice response to domestic violence, reform has
focused on both police actions and prosecutors' policies and practices in handling
domestic violence cases." One of the most widespread reforms has been
expanding the authority of the police to make arrests, and in some jurisdictions,
adopting a policy of mandatory arrest in cases of domestic violence. 29 In the area
of prosecution policies, reformers have worked toward encouraging prosecutors to
implement what has been termed "evidence based" prosecution. 0 Evidence based
prosecution is a process by which prosecutors develop their case recognizing that in
many cases the victim, for a variety of reasons, will not participate in the
prosecution. 31 In order to proceed successfully with prosecution, other strategies of
gathering and using evidence must be utilized, including use of emergency 911
tapes, excited utterances of the victim at the scene, testimony of witnesses, and
photographs.32
Efforts to make the civil justice system more responsive to domestic violence
have resulted in the creation of statutory civil protective orders. 33 Civil protective
26. See AM. BAR ASS'N. & U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LEGAL INTERVENTIONS IN FAMILY VIOLENCE:
RESEARCH FINDINGS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 37-38 (1998) (describing the public demand to stop
partner violence and the civil and criminal justice system responses to it, including: mandatory arrest
and proarrest policies, civil protection orders, and court-ordered treatment for offenders) [hereinafter
LEGAL INTERVENTIONS]; Elena Salzman, Note, The Quincy District Court Domestic Violence
Prevention Program: A Model Legal Framework for Domestic Violence Intervention, 74 B.U. L. REV.
329, 333 n.25 (1994) (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 209A, § 3(a) (1992), which defines abuse and
allows courts to issue civil protective orders to prevent abuse).
27. Hart, supra note 25, at 4.
28. See LEGAL INTERVENTIONS, supra note 26, at 37-38 (describing the public demand to stop
partner violence and the civil and criminal justice system responses to it, including, mandatory arrest
and pro-arrest policies, civil protection orders, and court-ordered treatment for offenders).
29. Id. at 38 (reporting that research suggests that "mandatory arrest as a deterrent to future violence
works better for some perpetrators than for others, and that it is more effective in the short term than in
the long run"); see also R. EMERSON DOBASH & RUSSELL P. DOBASH, WOMEN, VIOLENCE AND SOCIAL
CHANGE 169-70 (Routledge 2002) (1992) (discussing the development of family crisis intervention and
explaining that mandatory arrest can inflame conflicts due to a perception of an alliance being formed
between the complaining woman and the arresting officer, thus further emasculating the male offender,
and arguing for police officers to act as mediators and counselors trained in crisis intervention).
30. See Richard D. Friedman & Bridget McCormack, Dial-in Testimony, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1171,
1190 n.72 (2002) (noting that as of 1995, 30% to 40% of jurisdictions were proceeding in domestic
violence cases without complainants); see also David Jaros, The Lessons of People v. Moscot:
Confronting Judicial Bias in Domestic Violence Cases Interpreting Crawford v. Washington, 42 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 995, 1000-03 (2005) (discussing domestic violence and the emergence of evidence-based
prosecution); Andrew King-Ries, Crawford v. Washington: The End of Victimless Prosecution?, 28
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 301, 310 (2005) (recognizing that police begin and conduct investigations with the
assumption that a victim will not be present at trial).
31. See King-Ries, supra note 30, at 310.
32. Id. (discussing the proposition that evidence collection is done on the assumption that the victim
will not be present at trial).
33. See Salzman, supra note 26, at 333 n.25 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 209A, § 3(a) (1992),
which defines abuse and allows courts to issue restraining orders to prevent abuse); see also Molly
Chaudhuri & Kathleen Daly, Do Restraining Orders Help? Battered Women's Experience with Male
Violence and Legal Process, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CHANGING CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE
288 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa eds. 1992) (stating that a common form of legal remedy today is
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orders allow a victim of domestic violence to petition the court for an order to
remove the abuser from the home and restrain the abuser from contacting the
victim. 34 Civil protective orders are now available in all fifty states and the District
of Columbia. 35
B. Importance of Civil Protective Orders
In protective order proceedings, persons who are experiencing intimate partner
violence petition the court to ask for protection from their abusers and to have the
state, as manifested by the court system, assist them in their struggle to free
themselves from violence.16 Every week, thousands of women from across the
United States, ask for the protection of the courts.3 7 While victims of abuse look to
the courts for protection, it is important to place the courts and the law in historical
context when examining the role of the state and violence against women.
State institutions, including the legal system, have historically supported a
husband's right to abuse his wife.38 The disproportionate impact of domestic
violence on women arises, in part, from the historical tradition of legal and social
discrimination against women. 39 Prior to the relatively recent criminal prohibition
of domestic violence, assault against a wife by her husband was neither viewed as a
crime nor disapproved by the justice system. 40 The vast statistical difference
between men who experience domestic violence and women who experience
domestic violence is a manifestation of the historical and continuing subordinate
status of women in society.4' That subordinate status is embodied in the earliest
the civil protection order); LEGAL INTERVENTIONS, supra note 26, at 37 (describing the public demand
to stop partner violence and the civil and criminal justice system responses to it, including: mandatory
arrest and pro-arrest policies, civil protection orders, and court-ordered treatment for offenders).
34. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 518B.01 et. seq. (2005) (defining types of protection available to a
person seeking an order for protection, including restraining the abusing party from abusing the
petitioner, excluding the abusing party from a residence he may share with the petitioner or from a
reasonable area surrounding that residence, and establishing temporary child custody and support
arrangements, among other things).
35. Salzman, supra note 26, at 333 n.25; see also Hart, supra note 25, at 4.
36. See generally PETER FINN & SARAH COLSON, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL PROTECTION
ORDERS: LEGISLATION, CURRENT COURT PRACTICE, AND ENFORCEMENT 19-30 (1990) (suggesting
ways the justice system can better enforce protection orders to aid victims of domestic violence).
37. See MEADE & TASSIE, supra note 7, at 5 (providing a summary of data on the nature and scope
of sexual and domestic violence); Sorenson & Shen, supra note 7, at 913 (discussing the prevalence of
restraining orders obtained by battered women in the United States); Tsai, supra note 7, at 1291-94
(criticizing the traditional legal system's approach to domestic violence based on the number of victims
seeking protection annually).
38. See, e.g., R. Emerson Dobash & Russell P. Dobash, Wives: The 'Appropriate' Victims of
Marital Violence, 2 VICTIMOLOGY 426 (1978).
39. Id. at 427-32.
40. See State v. Black, 60 N.C. 262 (Win. 1864); State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. 453 (PhiL 1868).
41. See Suzanne K. Steinmetz, The Battered Husband Syndrome, 2 VICTIMOLOGY 499, 501 (1978)
(recognizing that husband battering is overshadowed by wife battering); R. EMERSON DOBASH &
RUSSELL P. DOBASH, WOMEN, VIOLENCE AND SOCIAL CHANGE 264-69 (1992) (stating that "historical
evidence has repeatedly demonstrated that women were the most usual victims of violence in the home.
. [because] the use of physical force and violence has traditionally been a prerogative of men who were
given the rights and responsibilities over all members of households").
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laws of England and the United States.4 2  For example, in Anglo-Saxon law,
women were possessions and brides were purchased.4 3 In the nineteenth century,
Blackstone notably referred to the unity of person between husband and wife,
explaining that "by marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law, that is,
the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or
at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband; under whose
wing, protection, and cover, she performs everything." 44 Thus, through common
law tradition, a woman's identity and autonomy were legally subsumed by her
husband upon marriage. 45  Men were charged with the obligation of controlling
their wives and permitted to "chastise" them through physical force as a means of
discipline. 46
To protect the right of men to use physical force against their wives, courts
historically viewed it as a private familial matter and refused to penetrate the
"curtain" of privacy constructed around the practice of domestic abuse. 47 The
notion that the husband's violence was provoked by the inappropriate behavior of
the wife was also a factor in courts' unwillingness to intervene and hold the
husband accountable for his violence. This failure to intervene resulted in the court
system legitimizing and perpetuating male violence against women.4 8  Historian
Linda Gordon describes battering as a social problem.49 She suggests that it is a
social problem that has been sanctioned through many societal and cultural
institutions, including the law.50 The history of feminist law reform efforts with
respect to domestic violence is a history of continuing attempts to have the state
exercise its power to challenge male violence against women.5
Victims of domestic violence use a variety of strategies in seeking protection
from violence. One of the strategies utilized by many victims is to obtain a civil
protective order from the courts. 2  The creation of civil protective orders
counteracts the historical veil of privacy by emphasizing the public nature of the
42. See DOROTHY WHITELOCK, ENGLISH HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS C. 500-1042,402,412 (1979).
43. See id. at 402 (reproducing law code from the early seventh century that references the buying of
a wife).
44. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *433, *442.
45. Id.
46. See Dobash & Dobash, Wives, supra note 38, at 429 (discussing the history of violence against
women as a form of chastisement); Jerome Nadelhaft, Wife Torture: A Known Phenomenon in
Nineteenth Century America, 10 J. AM. CULTURE 39 (1987) (providing historical analysis of a variety of
nineteenth century sources depicting "wife torture").
47. See Rhodes, 61 N.C. at 454 (stating that courts have been "loath to take cognizance of trivial
complaints arising out of the domestic relations... because the evil of publicity would be greater than
the evil involved in the trifles complained of'); Black, 60 N.C. at 263 (holding that "law will not invade
the domestic forum, or go behind the curtain").
48. See Black, 60 N.C. at 264 (holding that where "[t]he husband, in a passion provoked by
excessive abuse [by the wife], pulled her upon the floor by the hair ... the jury ought to have been
charged in favor of the [husband]").
49. LINDA GORDON, HEROES OF THEIR OWN LIVES 285 (1988).
50. Id.
51. See JAMES PTACEK, BATTERED WOMEN IN THE COURTROOM: THE POWER OF JUDICIAL
RESPONSES 12-15 (1999) (describing the conflicted nature of state intervention with regard to male
violence against women).
52. See, e.g., id. at 69 (stating "the courts are hearing women's testimony about battering to an
unprecedented degree").
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crime. 3 It is also a response to the past failure of the criminal justice system to
effectively protect victims from violence.
54
Women seek protective orders for a variety of reasons. A number of studies
have shown that most of the women seeking protective orders have already
physically separated from their partners.55  At the same time, an overwhelming
majority of the women seeking protective orders are mothers of young children. 6
As noted previously, attempts to leave an abusive relationship in order to secure
safety can generate what has been termed "separation assault".5 7  Assaults at
separation or attempted separation are challenges to the autonomy and
independence of the woman.5 8 One scholar asserts that separation assault is the
main reason women seek protective orders. 59 By petitioning for legal protection
from the courts, victims of domestic violence who separate or attempt to separate
are seeking state intervention to aid their resistance to abuse, help assert their
autonomy and support their right to bodily integrity.
One study questioned women waiting at the courthouse as to why they were
seeking orders for protection. 60 It found that ninety-two percent of the women were
asking for orders because they were tired of the abuse and, for seventy-five percent
seeking an order for protection was a last resort after other requests for help had
failed.6 ' The women surveyed also expressed faith in the justice system to protect
them, as ninety-five percent felt that the police would respond quickly to violations
of the order.62 This study also found that the women "recognize that the abuse is
escalating and beginning to have a negative impact on their children, and they feel
like the court is their last resort to being able to successfully end the violence in
their lives. '63 Thus, the court was seen as an authoritative voice to intervene in the
violence and protect the women and their children.64 The researchers concluded
that access to the court was also seen as a tool to reclaim "what abuse has
systematically stripped from them: their control over their activities, their bodies,
and their lives.
65
53. See id. (stating that "men's violence against women is more public than ever before").
54. See FiNN & COLSON, supra note 36, at 1-5 (discussing the advantages of civil protection orders
over traditional criminal justice practices).
55. See PTACEK, supra note 51, at 72 (concluding from an analysis of random protective order files
in Massachusetts that only 35% of the women were living with defendant when they applied for the
restraining order and that this finding is similar to the results of studies in Pennsylvania and Colorado).
56. Id. at 73 (finding that in Dorchester, Mass., 82% of the women seeking orders were mothers, in
Quincy, Mass., that figure was 70% and these findings are consistent with other studies of restraining
orders).
57. Mahoney, supra note 22, at 6.
58. Id. (suggesting "separation assault" is the result of an ongoing struggle for power and control in
the relationship).
59. Id. at 68.
60. Karla Fischer & Mary Rose, When "Enough is Enough": Battered Women's Decision Making
Around Court Orders of Protection, 41 CRIME & DELINQ. 414 (1995).
61. Id. at416.
62. Id. at 417.
63. Id. at 420.
64. id. at 424-25 (stating intervention by the legal system interrupts a pattern of control and
domination over the battered women and the court order may serve as a symbol of confidence for them).
65. Id. at 423.
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Women also seek protective orders to support their autonomy in decision-
making about their children. 66 Many of the protective order affidavits studied in
Massachusetts described violence by the abuser that was in response to the
woman's resisting or questioning the abuser's "authority" over children. 67 The
familial relationship of the abuser to the children can be a central issue in triggering
violence by the abuser in order to assert his control over the home and the persons
who reside in it and to resist his partner's exercise of independence. 6
C. Effectiveness of Civil Protective Orders
1. Civil Protective Order Remedies and Criminal Prosecution Compared
The criminal justice system focuses on a particular act at a particular time and
limits information by applying various rules of procedure and evidence.69 The
criminal process, which is highly adversarial, is incident focused and disaggregates
the victim's experience. 7 The model is based on the value that an adversarial
process is ultimately the best pathway to the truth.7' It is focused on the
prosecution of the defendant, not the safety of the victim.
This model of criminal justice with these characteristics is not ideally suited to
responding to domestic violence. It exacerbates the power differential between the
parties and forces victims to come into contact with their abusers in a hostile
setting.72 It also requires victim/witnesses to be subject to cross-examination from
the abuser's legal counsel who is trying not necessarily to determine the truth, but
to defend his/her client by questioning credibility and challenging veracity.73 The
focus on the particular act in the domestic violence context means that violence in
the life of the abused woman is disaggregated and isolated so that a more
comprehensive picture of the abuse and coercion that mark her life is obscured.
The civil process, in contrast to the constraints of criminal prosecution, can
allow the victim to provide a broader context and meaning to her experience and to
convey that experience to the court.74 Remedies generally available through
protective orders can structure and organize familial relationships while focusing
66. PTACEK, supra note 51, at 82-84.
67. Id. (describing motive for abuse as punishment for questioning male authority over the children;
threatening to coerce custody and child care decisions; and retaliation for women seeking child support).
68. Id.
69. See, e.g., MINN. R. EvoD. 401 (defining relevant evidence); MINN. R. EvID 402 (directing that
relevant evidence is generally admissible and irrelevant evidence is not).
70. See 2 JOHN H. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT THE
COMMON LAW § 1367 (1904).
71. See id. (stating cross examination "is beyond any doubt the greatest legal engine ever invented
for the discovery of truth").
72. See Carol E. Jordan, Intimate Partner Violence and the Justice System: An Examination of the
Interface, 19 J. INrERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1412, 1413 (2004) (noting that legal proceedings give little
control to a victim and expose her directly to the offender).
73. Id. at 1413 (citing CAROLINE E. JORDAN ET AL., INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE: A CLINICAL
TRAINING GUIDE FOR MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS 135 (2004)).
74. See Jordan, supra note 72, at 1423 (noting that "most aspects of the criminal system are distinct
from civil law").
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on the safety of the petitioner and the children. 75 The protective order cause of
action was created through state legislation as a companion to, and in some cases a
substitute for, criminal prosecution because the criminal process has been less than
effective in providing for victim safety and offender accountability.7 6
When women seek a protection order it is often after serious violence. 77
Research also suggests that an order is not sought after the first incident of violence
but rather is sought after repeated violence.78 In requesting this intervention from
the court, victims of domestic violence seek to have the state vindicate their right to
bodily integrity. 79 This request is not undertaken lightly given the threats and
retaliatory violence experienced by many who seek the state's help.80 The serious
level of violence and the duration of the abuse experienced by victims before
seeking a protective order confirm the danger and potential lethality of the violence
in the lives of victims who decide to seek protective orders.8
Protective orders have proven to be effective in reducing violence against
women. Studies have shown that women report "lower levels of intimate partner
violence for up to two years after seeking assistance. ' 82 In another study seeking to
measure the effectiveness of protection orders to prevent future violence,
researchers found that a permanent protection order was associated with a
significant decrease in subsequent police-reported physical violence. 3  Contact
with the court system in requesting a protective order, regardless of whether the
protective order is actually granted, also seems to result in decreased violence.84
Another study of 150 women who applied for and were qualified to obtain a
protective order found significant reductions in "threats of abuse, physical abuse,
75. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01(6)(4) (2004) (establishing that to award temporary
custody or parenting time in a protective order proceeding the court should give "primary consideration
to the safety of the victim and the children" and that if safety would be "jeopardized by unsupervised or
unrestricted parenting time, the court shall condition or restrict or ... deny parenting time entirely, as
needed to guard the safety of the victim and children").
76. See Jordan, supra note 72, at 1422 (noting, "Studies evaluating the effectiveness of prosecution
with the measure of offender recidivism have reported little effect of this type of sanction ....").
77. See id. at 1423 (finding that women typically seek orders of protection after experiencing
physical assault, beating and choking, threats of harm or death, sexual abuse, threats with a weapon,
stalking, harassment and assault of their children).
78. Adele Harrell & Barbara E. Smith, Effects of Restraining Orders on Domestic Violence Victims,
in Do ARRESTS AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK?, 214, 231 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa eds.,
1996) (finding that duration of abuse for a woman before she requested court assistance was a median of
2.4 years).
79. See, e.g., Jordan, supra note 72, at 1413-14, (noting that women frequently seek court
intervention against their abuser at a later period of time when they are physically separate from the
relationship).
80. Id. at 1413 (noting women often experience threats or actual retaliation when they reach out to
the court).
81. Id.
82. Julia Henderson Gist et al., Protection Orders and Assault Charges: Do Justice Interventions
Reduce Violence Against Women?, 15 Am. J. FAm. L. 59, 67 (2001).
83. Victoria L. Holt et al., Civil Protection Orders and Risk of Subsequent Police-Reported
Violence, 288 J. AM. MED. ASSOc. 589,593 (2002).
84. Judith McFarlane et al., Protection Orders and Intimate Partner Violence: An 18-Month Study
of 150 Black, Hispanic, and White Women, 94 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 613,616-17 (2004).
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stalking, and worksite harassment" during the subsequent eighteen months.85 These
studies have limitations in terms of sample size and method of reporting later
violence.8 6 They are consistent, however, in finding lower levels of subsequent
violence when victims of domestic abuse seek protective orders. 87  While
admittedly "even those studies ostensibly showing success of protective orders
report a 20% to 40% violation rate," it must be acknowledged that accessing
protective orders is associated with reduced subsequent violence.88
Access to civil protective orders is critical for victims of abuse. While not a
complete solution to protecting victims of domestic violence, research suggests that
obtaining an order is generally associated with a reduction in violence after the
order is issued. 9 The acknowledged importance of access to this process for
victims of violence leads to the question of whether persons who are requesting
state protection from violence have the opportunity to be represented by counsel to
help them navigate the judicial process and have their voices heard in the
courtroom.
2. Lack of Representation in Civil Protective Order Proceedings
The trend over the last decade has been increasing numbers of unrepresented
litigants filing cases and appearing in court, particularly in family law, landlord
tenant, and small-claims cases. 90 Lack of legal representation is overwhelmingly
the condition of parties seeking and defending requests for protective orders. One
study found that in Lake County, Illinois, neither party was represented in 83.4% of
order for protection cases.9' This figure is consistent with other studies. In a recent
study of 300 order for protection hearings in an urban setting, only twenty percent
of the petitioners and twenty percent of the respondents had counsel. 92 Additional
confirmation of the overwhelming lack of representation is found in another study
that examined three different jurisdictions and found that victims of domestic
violence seeking orders for protection often appeared unrepresented; pro se
85. Id. at 617.
86. See, e.g., Holt et al., supra note 83, at 592 (noting concerns about the adequacy of the "study's
power and its internal validity"); Jordan, supra note 72, at 1427 (noting that "the ability to compare
efficacy rates across studies is limited").
87. See, e.g., Holt et al., supra note 83, at 593 (permanent protection orders were "associated with a
statistically significant 80% reduction in police reported violence").
88. Jordan, supra note 72, at 1427.
89. See Holt et al., supra note 83, at 592.
90. See Ronald M. George, Challenges Facing an Independent Judiciary, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1345,
1356 (2005) (noting that in some parts of California, two-thirds of litigants on both sides lacked counsel
in family matters); Jona Goldschmidt, The Pro Se Litigant's Struggle for Access to Justice: Meeting the
Challenge of Bench and Bar Resistance, 40 FAM. CT. REV. 36, 36 (2002) (noting "the surge in pro se
litigation in the family courts of every common law country"); Drew A. Swank, The Pro Se
Phenomenon, 19 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 373 (2005) (examining the rise in pro se litigation); Russell Engler,
And Justice for All - Including the Unrepresented Poor: Revisiting the Roles of Judges, Mediators, and
Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1987, 1987 (1999) (noting that "unrepresented litigants are flooding the
courts").
91. Paula Hannaford-Agor & Nicole Mott, Research on Self-Represented Litigation: Preliminary
Results and Methodological Considerations, 24 JusT. SYs. J. 163,170 (2003).
92. Outar, supra note 3, at 2-3.
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appearances were reported at eighty percent, 80.3 percent and 65.8 percent in the
three jurisdictions considered. 93
Adding to the difficulty of court access is that many women who experience
domestic violence and attempt to access the court for protection find that the abuser
retaliates and threatens them in response to their seeking protective orders.94
Because the unique circumstances of domestic violence mean that an abuser has
unusual access to his victim, retaliation is more easily carried out.95 Threats are
more credible when the person threatened has experienced harm from past threats
acted on by the abuser.96
The empirical studies examining protective order procedures paint a disturbing
picture. Victims of domestic violence seek court protection only after experiencing
serious abuse for an extended period of time.97 Accessing the judicial system
presents unique complexities for victims because of the inherent difficulties of a
system in which one must confront one's abuser who is also an intimate partner.98
The nature of that intimate relationship means that the victim is at greater risk and
more vulnerable to violence and intimidation.99 Yet, research tells us that the
93. See Margaret Martin Barry, Protective Order Enforcement: Another Pirouette, 6 HASTINGS
WOMEN'S L.J. 339, 350 n.38 (1995) (citing a 1987-1992 National Institute of Justice study).
Interestingly, in a 1999 survey, 80% of the American public believed that legal aid should be available
to the poor in cases of domestic violence. See F12001 Appropriations for the Legal Services
Corporation and Defender Services: Hearing Before the Subcom. on Commerce, Justice, State, the
Judiciary and Related Agencies of the Comm. on Appropriations, 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of
Doreen D. Dodson, American Bar Association citing 1999 Harris Survey), available at
http:/Iwww.abanet.org/poladv/testimony/sc032400.html. While apparently supportive of legal
assistance in certain civil cases, the public also is misinformed as to when the poor will be provided
counsel. See Earl Johnson, Jr., Toward Equal Justice: Where the United States Stands Two Decades
Later, 5 MD. J. CoNTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 199, 201 (1994) (citing a California State Bar commissioned
poll which found that 70% of Californians wrongly thought the poor would be afforded an attorney in
civil cases if they could not afford one).
94. See Leigh Goodmark, Law Is the Answer? Do We Know That for Sure?: Questioning the
Efficacy of Legal Interventions for Battered Women, 23 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 7, 34 (2004) (noting
that batterers use the legal system to abuse their victims when they can no longer reach them by other
means); Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L. REv. 747, 769-70 (2005)
(citing studies that show that batterers threaten retaliatory violence in at least half of all cases, that 30%
of batterers assault their victim during predisposition, and that 42% of batterers threatened to reduce
their economic support of victims if they continued to support the prosecution); Kim Y. Slote et al.,
Battered Mothers Speak Out: Participatory Human Rights Documentation as a Model for Research and
Activism in the United States, 11 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1367, 1387 (2005) (finding that batterers
used the Massachusetts family court system as a tool for "ongoing harassment, retaliation, and
intimidation of battered mothers"). Some states have attempted to address this problem by statute. See,
e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.56.540 (2004) (tampering with a witness is a Class C felony in the first
degree); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 914.22 (West 2006) (tampering with a witness, victim, or informant
constitutes a third degree felony); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 36.06 (West 2005) (obstruction or
retaliation is a third degree felony).
95. Jordan, supra note 72, at 1413.
96. id.
97. See Harrell & Smith, supra note 78, at 231 (finding that duration of abuse for a woman before
she requested court assistance was a median of 2.4 years).
98. See Jordan, supra note 72, at 1412 (noting "there is substantial evidence that women victimized
by crimes in which the offender is known to them face distinctive difficulties with [sic] they seek the
court's remedies").
99. Jordan, supra note 72, at 1413.
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parties most at risk and potentially most intimidated who seek protection from
violence are highly unlikely to have legal representation to help them navigate the
intricacies of the process and to advocate on their behalf. °° Research also tells us
that lawyers matter; parties who have legal representation are significantly more
likely to obtain protective orders and to obtain comprehensive relief in those
orders.101
11. STATE ACTION
The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees that the state
shall not deprive any person of "life, liberty, or property without due process of
law," nor shall the state deny any person "the equal protection of the laws."'0 2 In
general, individuals can assert constitutional rights only against governmental
entities, rather than against private actors.103  However, courts will apply
constitutional constraints on private actors if there is a sufficient degree of state
involvement. 1°4 The "state action" requirement "preserves an area of individual
freedom by limiting the reach of federal law," and avoids holding states responsible
for conduct they cannot reasonably control. 105 It also ensures that constitutional
standards are invoked "when it can be said that the State is responsible for the
specific conduct of which plaintiff complaihs."'1 °6 Scholars have critiqued the
retention of a sphere of private conduct not reached by constitutional protections
both because the doctrine as articulated by the United States Supreme Court lacks
clarity, 0 17 and also because the unregulated private realm has been a space of
100. Outar, supra note 3, at 2-3.
101. There is research that suggests that those parties who have legal representation are significantly
more likely to obtain a protective order than those who are unrepresented. See PETER FINN & SARAH
COLSON, NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, CIVIL PROTECTION ORDERS: LEGISLATION, CURRENT COURT
PRACTICE, AND ENFORCEMENT 19 (1990) (finding that "those victims who are not represented by
counsel are less likely to get protection orders - and, if an order is issued, it is less likely to contain all
appropriate provisions regarding exclusion from the residence, temporary custody of children, child
support, and protective limitations on visitation rights").
102. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
103. Although the state action doctrine most frequently appears in Fourteenth Amendment cases, it
also applies to other constitutional amendments. See, e.g., Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513
U.S. 374, 392 (1994) (finding state action violating First Amendment); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461,
462 (1953) (finding state action violating Fifteenth Amendment); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 502
(1946) (finding state action violating First Amendment).
104. See Lebron, 513 U.S. 374, 392 (Amtrak is considered a state entity even though its charter
specifically disclaims state entity status).
105. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936-37 (1982) (discussing Fourteenth Amendment
in holding corporate creditor violated 1871 civil rights statute by attaching debtor's property before
judgment "under color of state law").
106. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982) (holding Medicaid recipients failed to establish
state action where state-regulated nursing home committed administrative abuses).
107. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001) (noting
that state action criteria lack "rigid simplicity"). See also Richard S. Kay, The State Action Doctrine, the
Public-Private Distinction, and the Independence of Constitutional Law, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 329,
332, 335 (1993) (noting that most of the scholarly commentary has been unsympathetic to the
public/private distinction); Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw. U, L. REV. 503, 505
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violence and constraint for women. 08 Nevertheless, the private/public distinction
has survived despite scholarly criticism. 1° 9
In this context, the following questions need to be asked: Is intimate partner
battering or domestic violence simply a private act between two parties or
something more? Is there a public aspect to domestic violence and the message it
communicates? Does the creation by the state of a civil cause of action that holds
out the promise of protection to victims mean that the state has undertaken
sufficient action to overcome this barrier to the application of Fourteenth
Amendment requirements of due process?
A. Determining State Action
Historically, the Supreme Court has used two tests to determine if state action
is present. 10 The first test subjects a private actor to constitutional requirements if
the state delegated a traditional state or "public" function to the private entity." 1
The other test looks to identify a close nexus or entanglement between the state and
the function in question such that the court may fairly treat seemingly private
behavior as that of the state itself."12 Because the Supreme Court has refused to
"formulat[e] an infallible test, 1" 3 a finding of state action will depend in large part
on how the Court "sift[s] the facts and weigh[s] the circumstances."' 1 4
While early iterations of the doctrine appeared to have potentially broad
application, courts have since demonstrated a growing reluctance to burden private
entities with constitutional requirements through the public function doctrine."15
Thus, early cases applied the doctrine to find public function in private property
(1985) (asserting that scholars have persuasively argued that the state action doctrine can not be
rationally applied).
108. Andrew King-Ries, True To Character: Honoring The Intellectual Foundations of the
Character Evidence Rule in Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REv. 313, 362
(2004) ("the private sphere has been primary in perpetuating male domestic violence against women");
Amy E. Pope, A Feminist Look at the Death Penalty, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 257, 273-74 (2002);
Miriam H. Ruttenberg, A Feminist Critique of Mandatory Arrest: An Analysis of Race and Gender in
Domestic Violence Policy, 2 Am. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 171, 185 (1994) ("The private sphere
of the traditional family structure has allowed men to batter without fear of state intervention, based on
the theories that domestic violence is a family matter and that victims of family violence provoke the
battering incident.").
109. See Mark D. Rosen, Exporting the Constitution, 53 EMORY L.J. 171, 199-204 (2004) (arguing
that the private/public distinction is not illogical and that it reflects deeply held cultural values).
110. See, e.g., Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155 (1978); see also Jackson v. Metro. Edison
Co. 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172 (1972).
111. See Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 155 (1978).
112. See Jackson, 419 U.S. at 351 (1974) (identifying the need for a close nexus between the state
and the challenged action); Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. at 172 (1972) (looking for the degree of
entanglement between the state and the private entity).
113. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 378.
114. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961) (holding that African-
American's Fourteenth Amendment claim satisfied state action requirement where a private restaurant
denied service to black patrons in a publicl facility).
115. See Laura A. Dickerson, Government for Hire: Privatizing Foreign Affairs and the Problem of
Accountability Under International Law, 47 WM. & MARY L. REv. 135, 166 (2005) (stating that over
the past three decades U.S. courts have been reluctant to find a nexus between private actors and state
action).
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used for a public purpose, such as a city park 16 and a company-owned town." 7
The Court also applied the doctrine to a number of election and voting cases." 8
Subsequent cases narrowed the doctrine's application, often focusing on whether
the function was "exclusively" in the domain of government." 9 These cases
declined to apply the doctrine to find public function in shopping centers, 20
creditors remedies, 12' publicly funded and administered private schools,' 2 state
regulated utilities, 23 nursing homes, 24 and amateur sports. 25  Even an "essential
public service" may fail to meet the exclusivity requirement. 26 At least one case
also suggests that, in addition to the exclusivity requirement, a court may consider
whether some statute or state constitutional provision in fact requires the state to
perform the function. 1
27
Despite these challenges, in more recent cases the Supreme Court seems to
have moved away from the exclusivity requirement and reformulated the state
action test into a two part determination as to whether the "deprivation of a federal
right [may] be fairly attributable to the state."' 28  The first question posed is
whether "the claimed deprivation has resulted from the exercise of a right or
116. See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 301-02 (1966) (focusing on the "public character" of a
public park and holding that the racially discriminatory operation of the park violated the Fourteenth
Amendment).
117. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506, 509 (1946) (holding that a town owned by a private
company could not restrict the community's fundamental liberties).
118. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 461 (1953) (holding that the Jaybird Democratic
Association, existing under auspices of Texas law, could not exclude black voters from pre-primary
elections); Smith v. Allright, 321 U.S. 649, 661-62 (1944) (finding that the privilege of party
membership makes party action state action when it is an essential qualification for voting in a primary
to select nominees for a general election); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 102 (1932) (finding
committee unconstitutionally denied franchise to black voters because it acted under authority expressly
delegated by the state); Nixon v. Hermdon, 273 U.S. 536, 541 (1927) (holding that discriminatory
policies of private political organizations could be attributed to the state).
119. See, e.g., Flagg Brothers, 436 U.S. at 157.
120. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 507 (1976) (holding First Amendment guarantees
inapplicable to a large, self-contained shopping center).
121. See Flagg Brothers, 436 U.S. at 157 (finding that a warehouseman's proposed private sale of
goods was not attributable to state and thus was not state action).
122. See Rendell Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1981) (holding that provision of education was
not the "exclusive" prerogative of the state, even though it was a function normally provided by the state
out of public funds).
123. See Jackson, 419 U.S. at 352 (finding that operation of privately owned utility, though state
licensed and regulated, was not a public function).
124. See Blum, 457 U.S. at 1011 (noting that day-to-day administration of a nursing home is not the
kind of decision traditionally and exclusively made by a sovereign for and on behalf of the public).
125. See S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 522 (1987) (determining
that neither the conduct nor coordination of amateur sports constituted a traditional governmental
function).
126. See Jackson, 419 U.S. at 354 ("Doctors, optometrists, lawyers, Metropolitan, and Nebbia's
upstate New York grocery selling a quart of milk are all in regulated businesses, providing arguably
essential goods and services 'affected with a public interest.' We do not believe that such a status
converts their every action, absent more, into that of the State.").
127. See id. at 353 (noting that while Pennsylvania statute imposes an obligation to furnish service on
regulated utilities, it imposes no such obligation on the state).
128. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937 (1982).
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privilege having its source in state authority."' 129 For example, is there use of a state
statute as well as state created procedures by which rights could be exercised? 30
The second question is whether the parties "may be appropriately characterized as
'state actors."' 13 A party may be characterized as a state actor if "he is a state
official, because he has acted together with or has obtained significant aid from
state officials, or because his conduct is otherwise chargeable to the state. ' 132 This
reformulation was articulated in Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co.,133 in which a debtor
brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a corporate creditor and its
president, alleging that by attaching his property before judgment, defendants acted
jointly with the state to deprive him of his property without due process of law.M
The Supreme Court found that Lugar was deprived of his property through state
action. 35 The Court found state action not only because of the private use of state
legal procedures, but also because the use of state legal procedures was
accomplished in conjunction with the participation of state officials. 136
The Lugar test was refined in the later case of Edmonson v. Leesville
Construction Co.137  Edmonson concerned the question of whether a private
defendant in a civil matter who used peremptory challenges to remove black jurors
violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 138 The Supreme
Court first focused on whether the exercise of peremptory challenges by a private
litigant in a civil case was state action. The Court applied the first part of the Lugar
analysis and found that because "[pleremptory challenges are permitted only when
the government, by statute or decisional law, deems it appropriate to allow parties
to exclude a given number of persons," 139 the action complained of had its basis in
state legislative authority and thus the first part of Lugar was satisfied. The Court
then turned its attention to the second part of the Lugar test. 140 In amplifying the
factors to consider when determining whether a private litigant can be a state actor,
the Court considered three principles: (1) "the extent to which the actor relies on
government assistance and benefits," (2) "whether the actor is performing a
traditional governmental function," and (3) "whether the injury caused is
aggravated in a unique way by the incidents of government authority.' 141
The Court went on to emphasize the substantial governmental assistance and
actions necessary to exercise peremptory challenges.142 It concluded that even if a
129. Id. at 939.
130. Id. at 937.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
134. Id. at925.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 941, 942. In Lugar, the clerk of court issued a writ of attachment, which was then
executed by the county sheriff.
137. 500 U.S. 614 (1991). See also Richard C. Reuben, Public Justice: Toward a State Action
Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 85 CAL. L. REV. 577, 620-21 (1997) (analyzing the United
States Supreme Court's rulings on what makes an action a government function).
138. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 616-17.
139. Id. at 620.
140. Id. at 621.
141. Id. at 621-22.
142. The Court explained:
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peremptory challenge may serve a private litigant's interest, the ultimate objective
is to determine representation on a governmental body and the delegation of part of
that process does not change its governmental character. 43 In the jury selection
process, the Court found the government and the private litigants are working
toward the same goal. 144
In a later case in which parties sought to use peremptory strikes in a racially
discriminatory manner, the Supreme Court again faced the issue of whether use of
peremptory strikes, this time by criminal defendants, constitutes state action.14 In
Georgia v. McCollum,146 the Court reiterated the analytical framework set out in
Edmonson.147 It again found that peremptory strikes had their source in state law
and therefore the first question pursuant to the Edmonson analysis was satisfied. 48
With respect to the question of whether peremptory challenges perform a
governmental function the court found that in a criminal case jury selection is part
of a unique and required government function. 149 The Court also indicated, as it
had in Edmonson, that the courtroom setting intensifies the effect of the private
party's discriminatory act because it becomes the action of the court and therefore
attributed to the state.' 50
B. Protective Order Proceedings as State Action
1. The Public Nature of Private Violence
The individual experience of domestic violence is informed by and informs
the social context within which it takes place."' It supports and is supported by the
secondary status of women. 52 That does not mean that each woman who
experiences domestic violence experiences it in the same way. 53 Nor does it mean
that every woman as an individual experiences domestic violence.1' 4 It does mean
that it is part of the social reality that women share and that it contributes to the
social inequality of all women. 55 The systemic nature of domestic violence
The government summons jurors, constrains their freedom of movement, and subjects them
to public scrutiny and examination. The party who exercises a challenge invokes the formal
authority of the court, which must discharge the prospective juror .... Without the direct
and indispensable participation of the judge, who beyond all question is a state actor, the
peremptory challenge system would serve no purpose.
Id. at 624.
143. Id. at 626.
144. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 627.
145. Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 44 (1992).
146. 505 U.S. 42 (1992).
147. Id. at 45-46.
148. Id. at 54-55.
149. Id. at 52.
150. Id. at 53.
151. Melanie Randall, Domestic Violence and the Construction of "Ideal Victims": Assaulted
Women's "Image Problems" in Law, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REv. 107, 110-11 (2004).
152. ld. at 111.
153. ld. at 113.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 112.
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supports an analysis of the abuse as structural, and as such, requiring a public
response. 5 6
The legal support for domestic violence has its roots in Anglo-American
common law. 157 As master of the household, the husband had the right to expect
obedience from his wife and to administer moderate chastisement if she questioned
his authority. 158 This view is not simply a remnant from the nineteenth century.
Rather, it is deeply embedded and a structural part of American life. 59 Thus,
domestic violence embodies two power relationships. The first is the individual
relationship of the perpetrator and the target of domestic violence. The second is
the relationship of both the perpetrator and the victim to the state and the state's
role in acquiescing in the occurrence of domestic violence. The fact that domestic
violence takes place within an apparently private relationship does not mean that
domestic violence does not have public meaning. The violence is a method of
exercising power and control over the victim. While it is targeted at an individual
woman to force her to behave in a certain way, it also has the effect of enforcing
gender roles. Domestic violence functions to regulate gender roles and enforce
gender hierarchy. The support of the state for domestic violence is characterized by
its inaction or by the grudging provision of apparent remedies that are difficult to
obtain. 160 The difficulty of obtaining adequate remedies is due at least in part to the
lingering historical and current reality of the privilege of male control and the
concomitant gender hierarchy domestic violence supports and maintains.' 61
The lack of appointed counsel for many victims of domestic violence who try
to access the protection of the law by petitioning for a protective order means that
an available remedy that has the potential to provide security and relief is in fact
undermined. 62 The failure to implement an effective remedy supports the violence
and the message of that violence that victims of abuse are not allowed to exercise
autonomy, but rather are to conform to a subordinate place in the gender
156. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE
OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 27 (1979) (arguing that sexual harassment in employment systemically occurs
and is structural and, as such, worthy of legal attention as sex discrimination, not just as a private matter
between two individuals).
157. Reva Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117,
2118 (1996).
158. Id. at 2123.
159. Gordon, supra note 49, at 285.
160. See Alexi Nicole Vital, Mandatory Reporting Statutes and the Violence Against Women Act: An
Analytical Comparison, 10 GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTs. L.J. 171, 183 (2000) (stating, "State officials,
including judges, prosecutors, and police officers continue to hold biases, which often blame the woman
who suffers from the abuse."); Donna M. Welch, Mandatory Arrest of Domestic Abusers: Panacea or
Perpetuation of the Problem of Abuse?, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 1133, 1145 n.104 (1994) (quoting an
advocate who estimated that fewer than ten domestic violence cases a year actually go to trial in New
York City); Pamela Blass Bracher, Comment, Mandatory Arrest for Domestic Violence: The City of
Cincinnati's Simple Solution to a Complex Problem, 65 U. CIN. L. REv. 155, 161 (1996) (noting that
domestic violence cases were characterized by low prosecution rates and high dismissal rates because of
prosecutors' reluctance to pursue cases of family matters that did not belong in court).
161. Vital, supra note 160, at 184.
162. See Martin, supra note 1, at 334-35 (explaining that lawyers can be crucial for domestic
violence victims because the lawyers make obtaining a civil protection order much easier).
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hierarchy. 163  This failure reinforces the social function of domestic violence as a
means of supporting gender subordination and inequality. 164 Within this structure,
the abuser supports and is supported by the state in maintaining the status quo of
gender inequality. 65 The state's passivity in the face of such violence is a failure
by the state to perform a basic duty of government. 166 The state's failure to protect
the victim of abuse and to provide the opportunity for meaningful intervention
works to keep victims enmeshed in a structure of confinement and
powerlessness. 1
67
In 1994, with the passage of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA),
Congress, for the first time recognized that all persons have a right to be free from
crimes of violence motivated by gender and that committing a gender-motivated
crime of violence could be a civil rights violation. 68  This section of VAWA was
found unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court because in the court's view its
enactment exceeded congressional authority under both the Commerce Clause and
the Fourteenth Amendment. 169  Nevertheless, the enactment of the civil rights
163. Randall, supra note 151, at 107-08.
164. Id.
165. See Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1431, 1490-92 (1992)
(giving a parallel analysis of the effect of homophobic violence combined with sodomy laws).
166. David Strauss, Due Process, Government Inaction and Private Wrongs, 1989 SUP. CT. REV. 53,
53 ("Whatever else the government is supposed to do, it is supposed to protect citizens against violence
by other citizens. Whatever else the social contract requires, it at least requires this much.").
167. See Deborah Epstein, Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases: Rethinking the Roles
of Prosecutors, Judges, and the Court System, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINIsM 3, 13 (1999) (stating that the
executive and judicial branches of government have lagged behind the legislative branch in responding
to domestic violence).
168. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2000).
169. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). The Court in Morrison did not find that crimes
motivated by gender animus were an economic activity with sufficient effect on interstate commerce to
justify congressional legislation under the Commerce Clause. Nor did it find that the Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection Clause applied to such crimes because the remedy was directed at
individuals rather than the state and there was insufficient state action. The holding in Morrison does
not preclude a due process requirement of counsel in a state created statutory remedy, e.g. a protective
order proceeding, that is governed by state procedures and includes activities by state officials
throughout the process.
Feminist scholars have critiqued the Morrison decision by pointing out that in VAWA, while
Congress recognized that gender-based violence has a negative impact on women's equality, the
Supreme Court in its decision did not. For example, Reva Siegel argues that the criticism of the civil
rights remedy based on federalism, i.e. that it interferes with an area of traditional state regulation and
could involve the federal courts in an avalanche of domestic relations cases, perpetuates a tradition of
effective privacy in which "assertions about love and intimacy in a relationship rhetorically efface the
violence of sexualized assault." Siegel, supra note 157, at 2205. Professor Siegel goes on to analyze the
federalism dispute by asking the following:
Suppose a man rapes, beats, or knifes his wife. Does a woman's ability to secure relief for
such injuries bear on her status as an equal citizen of this nation? Or is this question
properly of local concern, implicating matters of family law and criminal law, but not
matters of sex discrimination or equal protection? The assertion that VAWA interferes with
traditional state regulatory concerns implicitly, and explicitly, adopts the latter view. In
these objections the issue of gender bias that prompted VAWA's enactment recedes from
view, and sexualized assault appears as a problem concerning "family matters."
Id. at 2201. Catharine MacKinnon, in her critique of the Morrison decision, argues that the decision
limited access to a legal route to women's equality:
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remedy, if only in effect for a short period of time, is a legislative
acknowledgement of the public nature of the harm and its social context. 70 The
harm sought to be remedied becomes part of the larger human and civil rights
discourse and less an issue of a private, individual harm. 171 The shift in thinking
from private, individual harm and remedy to public civil rights remedy means that
the systemic and structural aspect of the harm is broadly recognized.
2. Civil Protective Order Proceedings Have Their Source in State Authority
States have responded to the need for protection for targets of domestic
violence by creating a civil order for protection statute. 72 As in Lugar and
Edmonson, this is a remedy that was created through state legislation. 173 Civil
orders for protection are a companion to and in some cases a substitute for criminal
prosecution of perpetrators of domestic violence. 174 Orders for protection exist
only because the state has legislated the cause of action into existence. 75 The cases
are filed in court with clerks of the court, they are heard in court before judicial
officers, and the rules of evidence apply. 176 Judicial officers preside and make
rulings regarding the evidence and ultimately determine whether a protective order
is issued. 177 The orders may be reviewed by appellate courts and violations of
orders are often criminal offenses enforced by local police or sheriff departments.178
These orders are produced and validated in a court of law. 179  Without state
Officially limiting equality rights to state acts while defining state acts extremely narrowly,
thus keeping the so-called private a sphere of impunity for violence against women, is a
public act . . . Violence against women is . . . self-enforcing. It is effective unless
addressed by law. In defining freedom from sex-based violence as a federal civil right,
Congress recognized what the Supreme Court denied: the problem pervades the nation's
civil society and state inseparably, so could only be effectively addressed by an instrument
that distinguished neither between one state and another nor between official and other acts
in determining what creates an inequality problem and what does not.
Catherine A. MacKinnon, Disputing Male Sovereignty: On United States v. Morrison, 114 HARV. L.
REv. 135, 171-72 (2000). Professor Mackinnon concludes that the Morrison decision "addressed ground
zero for citizenship - physical security - and ground zero for women's human status - sexual
inviolability. At stake was nothing less than whether women are full citizens and full human beings:
equals." Id. at 177 (footnote omitted).
170. MacKinnon, supra note 169, at 172 (2000).
171. Id.
172. See Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered Women: An
Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REv. 801, 810 (1993) (noting that currently all
50 states plus the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico make civil protection orders available to victims
of domestic violence).
173. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937 (1982); Edmonson, 500 U.S. at620 (1991).
174. See Klein & Orloff, supra note 172, at 895 (noting that orders of protection are filed
concurrently with criminal pleadings, to immediately protect the victim).
175. See, e.g., MNN. STAT. § 518B.01 (2004) (recognizing a cause of action known as an order for
protection in cases of domestic abuse)
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. See Klein & Orloff, supra note 172, at 1095 (describing different state methods for enforcing
violated orders of protection).
179. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 518B.01 (2004) (recognizing an action known as a petition for an order
for protection in domestic abuse cases).
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authorization, the protective order process would not exist. 18° Admittedly, these
proceedings are not initiated by the state nor is the state representing one party.1 8 1
However, as the Court in Lugar noted, "the procedural scheme created by the
statute obviously is the product of state action. This is subject to constitutional
restraints . . . if the second element of the state-action requirement is met as
well."182
3. Private Litigant in Protective Order Proceedings as State Actor
In Edmonson the court looked at three factors in determining whether a private
party could be described as a state actor: (1) the extent to which the party relies on
governmental assistance or benefits; (2) whether the action in question is a
traditional governmental function; and (3) whether the harm at issue is exacerbated
by the incidents of governmental authority. 183 Applying each in turn will determine
if protective order proceedings are state action for constitutional purposes.
a. Extent of Government Assistance and Benefits
The Court has found that simple use of state procedures without something
more does not turn a private party into a state actor.1 4 However, when there is
participation by state officials in what appears to be "private" conduct, that may be
sufficient to find state action.' In Lugar the Court held that invoking the aid of
state officials by having the clerk of the state court issue a writ of attachment based
on an ex parte petition, which was then executed by the sheriff, followed by a
hearing on the propriety of the attachment was sufficient to find joint participation
and therefore state action. 86 In applying the governmental assistance and benefit
principle in Edmonson, the Court looked at the role of peremptory challenges in the
jury system, which the government administers. 187 The Court noted that the
government sets juror qualifications, as well as procedures for picking jurors.188 It
is the clerk of court who summons the jurors and the judge in the courtroom who
exercises control over voir dire and who oversees challenges. 8 9
The court system and, therefore, the government, are at least as closely
involved in order for protection proceedings as they are in prejudgment attachment
(Lugar) or peremptory challenges by private parties in civil litigation
(Edmonson). 90 Petitions for relief in protective order cases are filed in court, the
court is required to provide clerical assistance to petitioners and provide forms,
180. Id.
181. Id. (showing that an individual or family files for an order of protection, not the State).
182. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 941.
183. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 621-22.
184. See Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 157 (holding that a warehouseman's proposed private sale of goods
pursuant to New York's Uniform Commercial Code without any overt official involvement by a state
officer was not attributable to the State of New York and thus not state action).
185. Id.
186. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 942.
187. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 621-22.
188. Id. at 622.
189. Id. at 623.
190. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 942; Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 614.
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filing fees are waived by statute, the court determines if the petition meets the
statutory requirements to issue an ex parte order, county sheriffs serve the orders,
court hearings are scheduled by the clerk, and hearings occur before judges who
make evidentiary rulings and determine the outcome.' 9' If the order is granted,
sheriffs aid in its execution. 192
The level of government participation in what appears to be private conduct is
extraordinarily high. While the parties to the litigation are private, the actions that
must be taken to obtain a protective order are inexorably intertwined with the
government. The typical statutory scheme describes a high degree of governmental
assistance. The use by private litigants of the state statutory framework to obtain
an order for protection necessarily requires the joint participation of state actors. It
is therefore state action and subject to constitutional constraints. 93
b. Traditional Government Function
The Court has not announced a bright line rule or test to determine what is and
what is not a public function. 194  As indicated previously, the Court has found
private actors performing a public function in a number of areas: when private
property is used for a public purpose, such as a city park and a company-owned
town and in election and voting cases. 195 Arguably, resolving disputes between two
private parties is not exclusively a state function. 96 However, in the more recent
cases of Lugar and Edmonson the Court has moved away from the exclusivity
element and it is largely absent in the Court's state action analysis. 197 In order for
191. The described role of the court and law enforcement is a typical state statutory scheme for
orders for protection. See, e.g., MNN. STAT. § 518B.01 (2004).
192. Id. (providing for the involvement of law enforcement in the execution of an order for
protection).
193. Just as in the criminal appeal context, once the state becomes involved in the process, it
becomes state action and it is incumbent on the state to proceed within constitutional boundaries. See
Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605 (2005) (recognizing that although there is no constitutional
requirement for the state to provide appellate review, once it does, access to the process may not be
restricted and it must comport with due process and equal protection guarantees).
194. See Paul Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory: A Casenote on Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, 130
U. PA. L. REV. 1296, 1327 (1982) (noting that a structural defect exists in any public function analysis
because, "[any characterization of the archetypal public function and the private activity supposedly
fitting into the archetype is inherently indeterminate").
195. See Evans, 382 U.S. at 301-02 (focusing on the "public character" of a public park and holding
that the racially discriminatory operation of the park violated the Fourteenth Amendment); Terry, 345
U.S. at 461 (holding that the Jaybird Democratic Association, existing under auspices of Texas law,
could not exclude black voters from pre-primary elections); Smith, 321 U.S. at 661-62 (finding privilege
of party membership makes party action state action when it is an essential qualification for voting in a
primary to select nominees for a general election); Marsh, 326 U.S. at 506, 509 (holding that a town,
owned by a private company, could not restrict the community's fundamental liberties); Condon, 286
U.S. at 88-89 (finding committee unconstitutionally denied franchise to black voters because it acted
under authority expressly delegated by the state).
196. See Reuben, supra note 138, at 620 (arguing that although private parties do use various private
means to resolve disputes, the state enforcement of arbitration decisions distinguishes modem ADR
processes from purely private action).
197. See Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 621-22 (Court refines the Lugar test by amplifying the factors to
consider as: (1) "the extent to which the actor relies on government assistance and benefits," (2)
"whether the actor is performing a traditional governmental function," and (3) "whether the injury
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protection cases, the parties apply to the court system for relief, the determination
of whether to grant a protective order is made by a judicial officer, and orders are
enforced by governmental law enforcement authorities. 198  This process is
essentially a government function. Once plaintiffs invoke governmental power by
accessing judicial proceedings, the judicial proceeding becomes the only effective
means of resolving the dispute and due process applies.' 99 The State's "monopoly
over techniques of final dispute settlement" would not be acceptable absent the
application of due process protections to the system.1tm "A State has an ultimate
monopoly on all judicial process and attendant enforcement machinery. As a
practical matter, if disputes cannot be successfully settled between parties, the court
system is usually 'the only forum effectively empowered to settle their
disputes."' 20' Domestic violence, by its nature, is not amenable to private
resolution between parties without court involvement. 2°2 The power differential
between the parties and the special vulnerability of victims mean that court
procedures and court-enforced protective orders are required to even approach
having an effective protective remedy.203
The state statutory scheme to create orders for protection for victims of
domestic violence contemplates a process in which state actors overtly participate
in the process at every stage and ultimately, if granted, produce a binding state-
enforced order.24 The orderly resolution of disputes through the rule of law is
fundamental to democratic society. 205 Order for protection proceedings, although
nominally brought into court by private parties, perform a traditional public
function by resulting in a binding resolution of a serious and sometimes life-
threatening dispute that is enforced by the state. Therefore such proceedings are
attributable to the state.
caused is aggravated in a unique way by the incidents of governmental authority"); Lugar, 457 U.S. at
937 (moving away from the exclusivity requirement and reformulating the state action test into a two-
part determination as to whether the "deprivation of a federal right [may] be fairly attributable to the
State").
198. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 518B.01 (2004) (showing that protective orders are granted by judicial
officers and are enforced by either the sheriff or constable).
199. See Boddie, 401 U.S. at 374 (ruling that a state's denial of access to divorce courts because of an
inability to pay violates due process, as these Courts are the only way to obtain a divorce in
Connecticut).
200. Id. at 375.
201. Boddie, 401 U.S. at 387 (Brennan, J., concurring in part).
202. See Sarah M. Buel, Effective Assistance of Counsel for Battered Women Defendants: A
Normative Construct, 26 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 217, 220 (2003) (stating some of the reasons women are
not able to leave their abusers).
203. See id. at 218 (stating that victims of domestic violence are often dependent upon the courts for
protection).
204. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 518B.01 (2004) (describing the procedures to obtain a protective order
including which state actors perform which functions in the process).
205. Boddie, 401 U.S. at 374 ("Perhaps no characteristic of an organized and cohesive society is
more fundamental than its erection and enforcement of rules defining the various rights and duties of its
members .... ").
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c. Incidents of Government Authority Aggravate the Injury
In Edmonson the Court recognized that the injury caused by the use of
discriminatory peremptory challenges was made "more severe because the
government permits it to occur within the courthouse itself. '206  The Court
described the courtroom as a setting, both symbolic and real, of constitutional
authority, where the pursuit of justice informs legal processes.207 The Court found
that the integrity of the judicial process and fundamental fairness were at stake
because the challenged action took place within the courtroom "where the law itself
unfolds." 208
In protection order proceedings, the judicial system is fully participatory in the
procedures that result in a courtroom hearing. 2°9 At the hearing, the court, through
a judicial officer, determines the outcome. 210  If the order is granted, it is
enforceable by the local law enforcement agency. 21' There is no question that
although these are private parties this is a public process that results in a public and
binding order. The court is using its power to provide a remedy in a public setting.
It is the court process that communicates a very public message to not only the
parties, but to larger society as well. The message communicated entails both a
message about how society views domestic violence and the appropriate judicial
response, but also the integrity of the court process itself. The need for this public
process to be fair and lead to a just result is critical if there is to be confidence in
the judicial system. Ultimately, the belief in fairness and due process of law
supports the structure of democracy and the willingness of citizens to resort to an
"orderly process of dispute settlement." 212 The provision of appointed counsel is a
basic protection meant to ensure due process and fairness in the protective order
procedure so that a just resolution results. 213 When the risk of violence is present,
the stakes are very high. The lack of counsel is cited by domestic violence victims
as the single most important factor in their ability to leave their abuser.
214
In Edmonson, the Court found state action in a private civil action in which
peremptory challenges were used in a racially discriminatory fashion due to the
extensive use of state procedures with the assistance of state officials. 21 The Court
was seriously concerned with the appearance of a trial court that would be
condoning discrimination in permitting peremptory challenges based on race -
racial discrimination would take on the mantle of governmental authority.216 The
Court found that "[r]acial bias mars the integrity of the judicial system and prevents
206. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 628.
207. Id.
208. id.




212. Boddie, 401 U.S. at 375.
213. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932) (explaining why being represented by
counsel in a hearing is necessary under the due process clause).
214. Rhonda McMillion, A Wider Net: ABA Backs Bills that Would Espand Support Services for
Domestic Violence Victims, A.B.A. J., Dec. 2005, at 73.
215. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 622-27.
216. Id. at 628.
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the idea of democratic government from becoming a reality.' '217 Confidence in the
fairness of the court is undermined when the integrity of the process is
questionable. This is no less true for protective order proceedings where the life
and safety of the petitioning party and the health and welfare of children may be at
stake. Failure to provide counsel to those who cannot afford it calls into question
the fairness of the process and risks escalating loss of trust and confidence in the
judicial system to resolve disputes. It may also undermine faith that the system will
provide protection from harm. The Court has acknowledged that the "right to sue
and defend in the courts ... is the right conservative of all other rights, and lies at
the foundation of orderly government. '218 The provision of counsel makes this
right meaningful. 1 9 It not only protects individualized due process rights to which
litigants are entitled by minimizing the risk of erroneous determinations, but it also
supports democratic values and citizen participation in society's conflict resolution
process. 220  The aggravation of the harm found in Edmonson of using
discriminatory peremptory challenges caused by the presence of the incidents of
government is no more significant than the aggravation of harm of failing to
provide appointed counsel in judicially conducted protective order proceedings.
III. HISTORY OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL
A. Criminal
The defendant's right to counsel in criminal prosecutions has slowly evolved
in the United States. Even though the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution
guarantees this right for criminal defendants, the circumstances under which this
right attaches have expanded. Initially the United States Supreme Court limited its
application by failing to find that the Sixth Amendment applied to state
prosecutions. It was not until 1932 and the case of Powell v. Alabama21 that the
court required counsel in a capital state court case. 222 In Powell the state of
Alabama prosecuted nine black men for the rape of two white girls. 223 Although
local counsel was appointed, no attorney appeared to defend the men, 224 At the last
minute, a reluctant lawyer came forward and represented the defendants, 225 They
were convicted. 226 The defendants appealed, asserting that they were denied
effective assistance of counsel. 227 The U.S. Supreme Court agreed, finding that
"[t]he right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not
217. Id.
218. Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907); see also Deborah L. Rhode,
Access to Justice, 69 FORDHAM L. REv. 1785, 1799 (2001) (quoting Chambers, 207 U.S. at 148).
219. Rhode, supra note 218, at 1799.
220. Id.
221. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
222. Id. at 71-72.
223. Id. at 49.
224. Id. at 53.
225. id. at 53-57.
226. Id. at 49-50.
227. Powell, 287 U.S. at 50.
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comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. '228 The Court did not, however,
extend the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to the states by incorporating it into
the Fourteenth Amendment. 229  Rather, the Court employed a Fourteenth
Amendment due process analysis in concluding that in this capital case, in these
circumstances, the defendants were deprived of due process because the
defendants' lives were at risk and because of the differential in power between
these particularly vulnerable defendants and the state.230
In 1942 the Court reaffirmed its decision to decline to apply the Sixth
Amendment to every defendant. 231 In Betts v. Brady23 2 the Court found that the
appointment of counsel in non-capital cases required a case-by-case evaluation of
the totality of the facts to determine whether lack of counsel would result in a
denial of fundamental fairness. 233 The Court applied an elastic notion of due
process to conclude that while the appointment of counsel was not required in
every case, in some circumstances due process could require the appointment of
counsel. 234
Twenty years after Betts, the Court once again considered the circumstances
under which a defendant was entitled to counsel.235 In the landmark case of Gideon
v. Wainwright2 36 the defendant, Earl Gideon was charged with a felony.237 Gideon
was unable to afford an attorney and requested that the court appoint one for him.238
The court denied his request and he was convicted of the felony charge.239 He was
sentenced to five years in prison, and his habeas corpus petition to the Florida
Supreme Court was denied.2 40 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that "in
our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too
poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for
him. 241 The Court overruled Betts242 and held that the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel in criminal proceedings is incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment
228. Id. at 68-69.
229. Id. at 65-66.
230. Id. at 67-71.
231. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 471-72 (1942), overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,
343-45 (1963).
232. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
233. Id. at471-73.
234. Id. In later cases, the court found a number of characteristics that amount to special
circumstances necessitating the appointment of counsel to comply with due process. See Carnley v.
Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 511-12 (1962) (illiteracy); Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155, 159-60 (1957)
(youth, race and minimal education); Palmer v. Ashe, 342 U.S. 134, 136-37 (1951) (mental deficiency);
Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786, 789-90 (1945) (complex legal questions).
235, Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
236. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
237. Id. at 336. On the same day that Gideon was decided, the Court also decided Douglas v.
California. 372 U.S. 353 (1963). In this case, the Court declared that indigent defendants were entitled
to the appointment of counsel in the first appeal as of right from a criminal conviction. Id. at 356-357.
The Court held that the denial of appointed counsel violated the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 357-358.
238. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 337.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 344.
242. Id. at 345.
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and thus applies to the states.243  Yet the Court failed to fully spell out the
parameters of the right to counsel.244  It did not indicate whether the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel applies to all criminal charges or only to more serious
felony charges. 245
It took almost ten years before the Court extended the right to appointed
counsel to all criminal proceedings where the defendant is threatened with
imprisonment. 246 In Argersinger v. Hamlin,247 the defendant was charged with
carrying a concealed weapon, an offense that was punishable by imprisonment up
to six months.21" The defendant was not represented by counsel; he was convicted
and sentenced to 90 days in jail.249 The United States Supreme Court found that
"[t]he assistance of counsel is often a requisite to the very existence of a fair
trial. '250 Citing both Powell and Gideon, the Court again noted the differential in
resources and power between the defendant and the government, as well as the
vulnerabilities a defendant faces when trying to mount a defense without the skills
and knowledge of an attorney.25' In finding that the Sixth Amendment required
provision of counsel, the Court held that "no person may be imprisoned for any
offense... unless he was represented by counsel. ' 252 The Court also examined the
particularities of misdemeanor case processing.23 It found that the vast volume of
cases created assembly-line justice, where defendants are moved along in the
system rather than being treated as individuals, and noted that studies have
documented that misdemeanor defendants represented by counsel were "five times
as likely to emerge ... with all charges dismissed. '254 The Court concluded that
"the problems associated with misdemeanor and petty offenses often require the
presence of counsel to insure the accused a fair trial.1255 Thus, rather than a case-
by-case analysis of the right to counsel, the Court adopted a per se rule following
the reasoning in Gideon.25 6
The Court retreated from this position in two subsequent cases. In Gagnon v.
Scarpelli,2 7 the respondent was on probation for armed robbery when he was
243. Id. at 342.
244. See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342-44 (acknowledging that the Court frequently limits holdings to the
facts and circumstances of that case, but not imposing such a limitation in Gideon). In his concurrence,
Justice Clark argued that the right to counsel extends to all criminal prosecutions. Id. at 348 (Clark, J.,
concurring).
245. Because Gideon was charged with a felony, the Court did not need to reach the issue of whether
appointed counsel would be required in cases of less serious charges. id. at 337 (majority opinion).
246. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972).
247. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
248. Id. at 26.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 31.
251. Id. at 31-32.
252. Id. at 37.
253. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 33-37.
254. Id. at 34-36 (citing ACLU, LEGAL COUNSEL FOR MISDEMEANANTS, PRELIMINARY REPORT I
(1970)).
255. Id. at 36-37.
256. Id.
257. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
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arrested for a subsequent burglary.258 Respondent's probation was revoked without
a hearing or legal representation. 259 In addressing the issue of the right to counsel,
the Court looked at the nature of a revocation hearing and concluded that Gideon
and Argersinger do not hold that application of a case-by-case approach "is
necessarily inadequate to protect constitutional rights asserted in varying types of
proceedings." 26°  The Court thus rejected what it termed an "inflexible
constitutional rule" and held that the need to appoint counsel in a parole or
probation hearing should be made on a case-by-case basis.26 '
The second case in which the Court narrowed the right to appointed counsel in
a criminal proceeding is the 1979 decision of Scott v. Illinois.2 62 In Scott the
defendant was convicted of theft and fined fifty dollars. 263 The defendant argued
that under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution
he was entitled to appointed counsel.2" At the time of his conviction, the
maximum penalty that could have been imposed was a fine not to exceed $500 or
imprisonment not to exceed one year, or both.2 65 In evaluating the application of
the right to appointed counsel in these circumstances, the Court moved away from
weighing the vulnerability of the defendant and the concomitant differential in
power and resources between the state and the defendant.266 Instead, the Court
viewed the actual sentence as the trigger for when the right to counsel attached. 267
It found that actual imprisonment is inherently different in kind from a fine or the
threat of imprisonment and thus is the correct "line defining the constitutional right
to appointment of counsel. '268 The Court asserted that previous decisions had
already extended the literal meaning of the Sixth Amendment and therefore the
court declined to extend the "reach of the Constitution ... further. '269 The rule of
actual imprisonment remains the touchstone of when the right to counsel applies in
criminal cases. 270
Most recently, the Court ruled on the question of the right to appointed
counsel in a case challenging Michigan's two-tier appellate system.271 The
defendant pled nolo contendere, appealed, and was denied appointed counsel for
his appeal.2 72 The Court held that the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses
required the appointment of counsel for those defendants convicted by plea who
258. Id. at 779-80.
259. Id. at 780.
260. Id. at 788.
261. Id. at 790.
262. 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
263. Id. at 368.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. See id. at 369 (declining to extend Argersinger despite similar resource disparity).
267. Id. at 373-74.
268. Scott, 440 U.S. at 373.
269. Id. at 372. The Court expressed doubt that the Sixth Amendment, as originally drafted,
guaranteed anything more than the right to counsel in a criminal prosecution in federal court. Id. at 370.
Justice Brennan emphasized in his dissent that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel applied to "all
criminal prosecutions." Id. at 375 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
270. Id. at 373 (majority opinion).
271. Halbert v. Michigan, 125 S. Ct. 2582 (2005).
272. Id. at 2584.
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seek first-tier appellate review.273 The Court acknowledged that while there is no
constitutional requirement that states provide appellate review of criminal
convictions, once such an avenue is provided, the state may not restrict indigent
defendants' access. 2 74 Emphasizing the error-correcting function of the Michigan
Court of Appeals, the Court concluded that untrained individuals need a lawyer's
assistance to navigate the complex issues and appellate process.2 75  The Court
further noted that "[w]ithout guides keyed to a court of review, a pro se applicant's
entitlement to seek leave to appeal to Michigan's intermediate court may be more
formal than real . 276
B. Civil
The right to appointed counsel traditionally has been explored in criminal
proceedings.277 It is, therefore, not surprising that the analysis has emphasized
imprisonment and loss of physical liberty.278 However, the concept of liberty as
articulated by the Supreme Court extends beyond mere freedom from physical
confinement. As long ago as 1923, the Court addressed the issue of whether a
statute that prohibited the teaching of the German language unreasonably infringed
liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 279 In reversing the conviction of
the teacher, the Court enumerated a number of situations that would encompass a
definition of liberty including,
not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the
individual to contract, to engage in any of the common
occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry,
establish a home and bring up children, to worship God
according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to
enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. 280
This more expansive conception of liberty has been affirmed by the Court in
more recent cases. In a 1982 case, parents appealed from a judgment finding their
children to be permanently neglected. 8' The Court, in considering whether the
standard of proof of fair preponderance of the evidence was constitutionally
273. Id. at 2585-86.
274. Id. at 2586-87.
275. Id. at 2591-92.
276. Id. at 2592.
277. See, e.g., Halbert, supra note 271 (holding Due Process Clause mandated counsel for indigent
defendant challenging sexual assault conviction in state appellate court); Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 141
(2001) (holding right to counsel only attaches to charged offenses); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966) (holding charged cannot effectively waive right to counsel absent warning designed to inform
him of such right).
278. See, e.g., Eric M. Freedman, Giarratano is a Scarecrow: The Right to Counsel in State Capital
Postconviction Proceedings, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1079, 1092-93 (2006) (identifying "physical liberty"
as "the most elemental of liberty interests safeguarded by due process") (internal quotations omitted).
279. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 396-99 (1923).
280. Id. at 399 (citation omitted).
281. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE MATTERSSummer 2006]
TEMPLE POLITICAL & CIVIL RIGHTS LAW REVIEW
sufficient found that "freedom of personal choice in matters of family life is a
fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. ' 282 The
Court used the balancing test articulated in Mathews v. Eldridge283 and emphasized
that the degree to which due process applies is dependent on the importance of the
interest at stake.284 The Court found, "In parental rights termination proceedings,
the private interest affected is commanding ....
The Court has attempted to draw a distinction for due process purposes
between issues that require uniformity, such as standards of proof and filing fees,
and those that the Court asserts can be determined on a case-by-case basis, such as
appointment of counsel. 286 In Boddie v. Connecticut,287 a group of women who
were welfare recipients challenged certain state procedures, including requirements
for payment of court fees and costs for service of process, which restricted their
access to the court to bring actions for divorce.2 88 The Court first found that
because of the State's monopoly over dispute resolution there is a critical need to
guarantee due process in order to maintain the legitimacy of the system. 289 In the
case of a right of basic importance such as marriage in which the state courts have
become the only venue for resolution, the Court found that due process requires
that at minimum the state must give "all individuals a meaningful opportunity to be
heard if it is to fulfill the promise of the Due Process Clause. 290 While recognizing
the fee as a law of general application, the Court held that its application in this
case was a denial of the due process that the state owes to each individual. 29'
Finally, in evaluating the state's pecuniary interest in preventing frivolous litigation
and allocating its resources through imposing fees and costs, the Court found that
the concerns expressed by the state were outweighed by a plaintiffs interest in
access to the court to adjust a fundamental human relationship, i.e., to dissolve a
marriage.29 2
Although the Court has recognized a broader conception of constitutionally
protected liberty beyond physical restraint, it has been reluctant to couple that
282. Id. at 753 (citations omitted). See also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (finding a
Texas statute criminalizing certain sexual conduct between two persons of the same sex unconstitutional
as a violation of the petitioners' right to liberty under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
283. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
284. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 757, 758.
285. Id. at 758. But see Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31 (1981) (holding that counsel
need not be appointed in every termination of parental rights proceeding). While acknowledging that
some due process protections can be determined on a case-by-case basis, the Santosky Court rejected
this approach, finding the evidentiary standard of proof question to be one of general application
requiring uniformity at the outset of the proceeding. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 757.
286. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 757; Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 380 (1971).
287. 401 U.S. 371.
288. Boddie, 401 U.S. at 372 (1971).
289. Id. at 375-76.
290. Id. at 379.
291. Id. at 380. In their concurring opinions, Justices Douglas and Brennan both found that the fee
requirement, as applied to the poor, was a denial of equal protection. See id. at 386 (Douglas, J.,
concurring); id. at 388-89 (Brennan, J., concurring).
292. Id. at 381-83 (majority opinion).
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broader liberty interest with a per se right to appointed counsel. 293 In its 5-4
decision in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 94 the Court focused not on
whether the proceedings were termed civil or criminal but rather on whether the
litigant's physical liberty was at stake.295 The majority opinion declared that
fundamental fairness means that "an indigent litigant has a right to appointed
counsel only when, if he loses, he may be deprived of his physical liberty. It is
against this presumption that all the other elements in the due process decision must
be measured. '296 Thus the Court rejected a per se right to appointed counsel. 297 It
went on to evaluate the extent of due process required by applying the balancing
test set out in Mathews v. Eldridge.298 The Court in Lassiter described the process
of evaluation as balancing three elements: the private interests at stake, the
government's interest, and the risk of an erroneous decision. 299 These elements are
balanced against each other and then the Court "set[s] their net weight in the scales
against the presumption that there is a right to appointed counsel only where the
indigent, if he is unsuccessful, may lose his personal freedom. ' '3°° Declaring that
these factors may differ from case to case, the Court looked back to the Scarpelli
case and adopted the standard previously articulated there that left it to the trial
court to decide on an ad hoc basis the necessity to appoint counsel. 30' By applying
the Mathews factors and weighing those factors against a declared presumption
against the necessity to appoint counsel, the Lassiter decision moves away from
giving great weight to the vulnerability of the litigant and the differential in power
between the state social services agency and the parent. The Court does
acknowledge that parental termination hearings may very well include complex
issues and expert testimony that few parents are trained to understand, much less
contest.30 2 The Court also recognizes that parents in these circumstances "are likely
to be people with little education, who have had uncommon difficulty in dealing
with life, and who are, at the hearing, thrust into a distressing and disorienting
situation. ' '303 However, possible vulnerabilities by unrepresented litigants are not in
and of themselves sufficient to require appointed counsel. 3°4 It is a factor in
determining the risk of an erroneous determination. 305 The decision focuses on
balancing the interest of the parent, the pecuniary interest of the state, and the risk
of error and then evaluating those factors against the presumption that providing
293. See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31-32 (finding that the Constitution does not require the appointment
of counsel in every parental termination case and leaving the decision to the trial court).
294. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
295. Id. at 25.
296. Id. at 26-27.
297. Id. at 31-32.
298. Id. at 37; Mathews, 424 U.S. 319.
299. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27.
300. Id.
301. Id. 31-32.
302. Id. at 30.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 31 ("[T]he incapacity of the uncounseled parent could be, but would not always be, great
enough to make the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the parent's rights insupportably high.").
305. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31.
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appointed counsel is not constitutionally required when physical liberty is not at
issue.
At the same time Lassiter was decided, the Court also decided a challenge to a
Connecticut statute that provided for the ordering of blood tests in a paternity
matter but required the party requesting the test to pay for them.3 In Little, a
defendant in a paternity action who was indigent and could not afford the costs of
the testing challenged the denial of his request that the state pay for the test. 307 The
Court held that the denial violated due process. 308 It premised its opinion on the
"unique quality of blood grouping tests as a source of exculpatory evidence, the
State's prominent role in the litigation, and the character of paternity actions under
Connecticut law. 3°9 The Court evaluated the three elements set out in Mathews to
determine what process was due.310 While the Court noted the importance of the
putative father's pecuniary interest, as well as his liberty interest in avoiding
sanctions for future noncompliance with support provisions, the Court emphasized
the importance of the familial bond created and the compelling interest of both the
defendant and child in ensuring the accuracy of the determination. 311 It further
found that given the absence of witnesses and the possibility of self-serving
testimony, the risk of an erroneous determination was considerable. 312 The State's
monetary interest in limiting its costs in these circumstances was not found to
outweigh the important private interests at stake.3 3 The Court associated the
interests and circumstances at stake in Little with the circumstances and interests
implicated in Boddie.314
Although the Court in Little found a due process right to the waiver of fees to
obtain blood tests in a paternity proceeding, it denied an earlier claim by welfare
recipients who challenged a filing fee for judicial review of an adverse decision by
the state welfare agency.3" 5 The Court concluded that the interest at stake did not
rise to the same level of constitutional importance as the indigent appellants who
were prevented access to the courts for divorce proceedings. 316 It also disposed of
the plaintiffs' equal protection claim by finding that because no suspect
classification such as race or nationality was present, in the area of economics and
social welfare all that is required is application of the rational justification
standard.3 17
The Court has been reluctant to find an equal protection violation in all civil
cases based on poverty alone; however, when such a case involves intrusions on
familial relationships, a claim for access to the judicial process is closely
306. Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981).
307. Id. Interestingly, the defendant did have an attorney provided by a legal aid organization
representing him in the proceedings. Id. at 3.
308. Id. at 17.
309. Id. at 6.
310. Id. at 13-16.
311. Id. at 13.
312. Little, 452 U.S. at 14.
313. Id. at 16 (citing Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 28).
314. Id. at 16 n.12 (citing Boddie, 401 U.S. at 379).
315. Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973).
316. See id. at 659 (referring to Boddie, 401 U.S. 371).
317. Ortwein, 410 U.S. at 660.
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scrutinized. 318 A Supreme Court case in which those principles were at stake is
M.L.B. v. S.L.J.319 In this case, M.L.B. had her parental rights terminated. 320 Her
former husband, S.L.J., and his current wife petitioned the court to terminate
M.L.B.'s parental rights so that S.L.J.'s current wife and step-mother to the
children could adopt them.3"' The Mississippi Chancery Court terminated the
rights of M.L.B. and approved the adoption.322 M.L.B. sought to appeal the
termination. 323 However, Mississippi required that the costs of record preparation,
approximately $2,300, be paid in advance.3 24 M.L.B. did not have the funds to pay
the preparation fees and her appeal was dismissed. 325 The Court, in the majority
opinion, relied initially on the reasoning in the Griffin case.326 In Griffin, the Court
found that when the state conditions an appeal of a criminal conviction on the
obtaining of a transcript, those too poor to pay for the transcript must be afforded
access for review of their convictions. 32 7 The Griffin decision drew on both equal
protection and due process principles.3 26 The Court expressed its concern that once
the state affords appellate review, while it "need not equalize economic conditions.
. . it cannot ...draw a line which precludes convicted indigent persons" from
access. 329 In relying on the Griffin analysis, the Court in M.L.B. pointed out that the
line of cases flowing from Griffin preclude arbitrary distinctions that create
obstacles to equal access to the courts and the principle of equal access is not
limited to cases where imprisonment is at stake. 33 0  However, the Court
acknowledged that while the Griffin line of cases is expansive, the line of cases
establishing the right to appointed counsel when indigent is more narrow in
scope.331 As the Court notes, there is no constitutional right to counsel unless
imprisonment is imposed and the right extends only to appeals as of right.332 The
opinion in M.L.B., however, goes on to point out that the Court has "consistently
set apart from the mine [sic] run of cases those involving state controls or
intrusions on family relationships. '3 33 In these types of cases, close examination is
required. 3 4 In discussing the ruling in Lassiter and its importance, the M.L.B. court
emphasized that Lassiter held that while there is no automatic right to counsel, the
commanding importance of the interest at stake and the need for legal guidance are
factors for the court to consider in determining whether appointment of counsel
318. See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996).
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 107.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 106.
324. Id.
325. M.LB., 519 U.S. at 106.
326. See id. at 110 (referring to Griffin v. Ilinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)).
327. Griffin, 351 U.S. at 18.
328. Id. at 17.
329. Id. at 23.
330. M.LB., 519 U.S. at 111-12.
331. Id. at 112-13.
332. Id. at 113.
333. ld. at 116.
334. Id.
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was due. 335 The Court also concluded that its precedents embodied the view that
family relationships are sufficiently fundamental to be encompassed by the liberty
interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.33 6
The Court goes on to indicate that previous judicial decisions dealing with the
right of access "reflect both equal protection and due process concerns. '3 37
Explaining the nature of the two concerns, the M.L.B. court notes that the equal
protection concern focuses on excluding access based on inability to pay while the
due process concerns focus on the essential fairness of the proceeding.3 38 The
Court aligned this case with Mayer v. Chicago,339 in which the Court found that an
indigent defendant convicted of two petty offenses and not facing any risk of
confinement had the right to access to appeal and could not be denied a transcript
needed for his appeal due to inability to payX40 The state's financial interest was
not sufficient to overcome the more important interest of the defendant.14 1
The Court in M.L.B. was careful to reiterate the general rule that required fees
need only be examined for rationality and that the state's need for revenue will
generally satisfy the rationality test. 342 Finding parental termination cases to be an
exception to that general rule, the Court held that a lack of ability to pay for the
record cannot be used to deny equal justice.343 The Court rejected limiting this
right to only "criminal" cases but confined the right by distinguishing parental
termination cases as an example of permanent interference in familial
relationships. 344
While it is difficult to synthesize a comprehensive set of principles arising out
of these decisions, some themes do emerge. First, if the issue at stake is not one of
physical liberty then the likelihood of successfully arguing that a per se right to
counsel is required by the Due Process Clause is diminished. If physical liberty is
not at stake, but the interest at stake involves a fundamental familial right that is
either highly regulated or created by the state, the Court is more likely to find that a
greater amount of process is due. The process that is due may encompass the
waiver of fees in order to ensure access to the judicial system. It does not
necessarily require provision of counsel unless the Mathews factors that the Court
repeatedly returns to in order to evaluate what process is due are met and outweigh
the presumption that there is no right to appointed counsel when physical liberty is
not at issue. Finally, with respect to whether judicial regulations that have a
disproportionate impact on the poor violate the Equal Protection Clause, the
Court's position is even murkier. Generally, without something more than a
disparate impact due to poverty, the Court will not find a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause unless there is also present an already recognized suspect class
335. Id. at 117.
336. M.LB., 519 U.S. at 119.
337. Id. at 120.
338. Id.
339. 404 U.S. 189 (1971).
340. See M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 107 (referring to Mayer, 404 U.S. at 195-96).
341. Mayer, 404 U.S. at 197.
342. M.LB., 519 U.S. at 123.
343. id. at 124.
344. Id. at 127-28.
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such as race or national origin. The M.L.B. case suggests that the something more
also may be a recognition of the state role in familial relationships.
IV. THE MATHEWS BALANCING TEST, THE LASSITER PRESUMPTION AND DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE
Where a procedural due process claim is asserted, the Court employs the due
process calculus defined in Mathews v. Eldridge,345 which balances the
government's interest in maintaining its current procedures against the private
interests at stake, and the risk that the current procedures would lead to an
erroneous determination. 346 Specifically, where one's right to appointed counsel is
in question, the court in Lassiter stated that the issue should be determined on a
case-by-case basis. 47 The court in Lassiter refined the Mathews test to include an
additional component: there is a presumption against mandatory appointment of
counsel unless there is at least a potential deprivation of one's physical liberty.
348
The presumption against appointed counsel, however, can be rebutted by the
Mathews factors.3 49 The burden is on the litigant to demonstrate that her private
interests and the risk of an erroneous determination are substantial enough to
outweigh the state's interest in not providing counsel. 350 If the "net weight" of
these factors suffices to rebut the presumption that there is no right to appointed
counsel, the Due Process Clause requires that the government appoint counsel to an
indigent litigant.35 1
As the Lassiter court explained, it is the person's interest in personal freedom
that triggers the right to appointed counsel. 352 In protective order cases, the target
of domestic violence is seeking access to the court because her physical integrity
and personal freedom are at stake.353 While physical liberty may not be at stake in
the conventional sense of incarceration, victims of domestic violence experience
violence and threats perpetrated by an intimate partner who is exerting control over
the victim's life and constraining her freedom and autonomy. 54  Even if this
exercise of violence and control does not amount to a deprivation of physical
liberty, the private interests at stake and the likelihood of erroneous decisions
345. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
346. Id. at 334-35.
347. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 26.
348. Id. at 31.
349. Id. at 26-27.
350. Id. at 31.
351. Id.
352. Id. at 25.
353. Andrea Brenneke, Civil Rights Remedies for Battered Women: Axiomatic & Ignored, 11 LAW &
INEQ. 1, 3 (1992).
354. See PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, EXTENT, NATURE, AND
CONSEQUENCES OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE, FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN SURVEY iii (2000), available at http:lwww.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/181867.pdf (noting the
violence that women experience is often part of emotionally abusive and controlling behavior); PrACEK,
supra note 51, at 12-15 (noting the familial relationship of the abuser to the children can be a central
issue in triggering violence by the abuser in order to assert his control over the home).
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substantially outweigh the state's pecuniary interest in denying appointed counsel
and rebut the presumption articulated in Lassiter.
A. Private Interest at Stake
1. Domestic Violence Limits the Fundamental Liberty Interest in Bodily
Integrity and Autonomy
In addition to its targets suffering a dignitary harm, domestic violence restricts
the most basic aspects of liberty - the right to bodily integrity and to move freely
without restraint. 355 Acts of domestic violence pose an immediate and present
danger to the physical survival of victims. 356 In addition, in many instances of
domestic violence, the victim's freedom of movement is controlled by the abuser. 357
Not only is the victim constrained at home by monitoring of phone calls, visits, and
violence or threats of violence, but outside movement is restricted or only allowed
when accompanied by the abuser.
At its most basic, liberty means the right to be secure and to move freely. 358
These most basic rights are denied to targets of domestic violence who, because of
a lack of security and violence-free movement, are denied fundamental rights of
citizenship and are unable to participate as equal citizens in the life of the
community.3 59 While the constraints on the liberty interest have not been precisely
defined, the interest includes the right to be free from bodily restraint 60 The party
seeking relief from the court in a protective order proceeding has a protected liberty
355. See Cynthia Grant Bowman, Street Harassment and the Informal Ghettoization of Women, 106
HARv. L. REV. 517, 520-21 (1993) (arguing that sexual harassment restricts the liberty of women in
public places and lessens their ability to participate in society as full citizens by forcing them into the
private sphere). I am suggesting that domestic violence may very well make the private sphere
restrictive and dangerous, thus further constraining women's roles as equal citizens.
356. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 518B.01 (2004) (requiring an allegation of immediate and present
danger of domestic abuse as the standard for granting an ex parte order for protection).
357. See Brenneke, supra note 353, at 3 (arguing that battered women are often deprived of their
rights to travel, work, speak, associate with others, and divorce, and that domestic abuse should be a
legally cognizable violation of civil rights).
358. See id. (stating that battered women are deprived of their personal liberty through physical
constraint, violence, injury and death); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125-26 (1958) ("Freedom of
movement is basic in our scheme of values.").
359. See Buel, supra note 202, at 253 (suggesting that domestic violence is situated within the
context of inequality that impacts women's fundamental rights of freedom, choice and autonomy);
Deborah M. Goelman, Shelter from the Storm: Using Jurisdictional Statutes to Protect Victims of
Domestic Violence after the Violence Against Women Act of 2000, 13 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 101, 168
(2004) (arguing that for battered women the fundamental right to liberty and right to raise children are at
stake); Elizabeth Schneider, Battered Women and Feminist Lawmaking, 23 WOMEN's RTS. L. REP. 243,
243 (2002) (describing how feminists in the 19"h century argued that violence against women, women's
equality, and women's citizenship were inextricably linked).
360. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673-74 (1977) (stating that while historically the liberty
interest has not been precisely defined, it has always been thought to include freedom from bodily
restraint and punishment).
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interest in personal freedom and security.3 61 This interest in personal security is not
simply a private, individualized interest. 362 Personal security and the right to be
free from domestic violence also encompass a governmental or public interest.
363
As one state supreme court has found, "the general public has an extraordinary
interest in a society free from violence, especially where vulnerable persons are at
risk."3 64
In withholding appointed counsel from the petitioner in Lassiter, the Court
relied on a limited definition of physical liberty. 365 The Court cited selected cases
which implied that, for due process purposes, the deprivation of one's physical
liberty and personal freedom is generally associated with instances of incarceration
or civil commitment. 66 However, a different line of jurisprudence that has
developed since Lassiter defines physical liberty more broadly.
3 67
In Washington v. Glucksberg,368 a case in which three terminally ill patients,
four physicians, and a nonprofit organization brought an action against the state of
Washington for a declaratory judgment that the statute banning assisted suicide
violated the Due Process Clause, the citizens argued that "the liberty protected by
the Due Process Clause includes basic and intimate exercises of personal
autonomy. 3 69 The citizens based much of their argument on the precedent of
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,3170 which specifically
addressed a woman's constitutional interest in physical liberty, and asserted that
"one aspect of this liberty is a right to bodily integrity, a right to control one's
361. Baker v. Baker, 494 N.W.2d 282, 287 n.6 (Minn. 1992) (applying the Mathews factors to a Due
Process challenge to the issuance of an ex parte order for protection and finding that one of the interests
at stake was the petitioner's protected liberty interest in personal security).
362. Id. at 288.
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 25 (quoting In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967), which held that a juvenile
delinquency action required appointed counsel for the defendant because of the possibility that the
litigation would result in the juvenile's commitment to an "institution in which the juvenile's freedom is
curtailed").
366. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199-200 (1989)
(stating that "when the State takes a person into its custody and holds him... the Constitution imposes
upon it ... some responsibility for his safety and general well-being"); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S.
307, 314-25 (1982) (holding that substantive due process requires the state to provide involuntarily
committed mental patients with some services that are necessary to ensure their reasonable safety from
themselves and others); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (concluding that deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes "unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain").
367. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753 ("freedom of personal choice in matters of family life is a
fundamental liberty interest"); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding Texas statute
criminalizing certain sexual conduct between two persons of the same sex unconstitutional as a violation
of the petitioner's right to liberty under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 915 (1992) (Stevens, J. concurring) (noting one aspect of
physical liberty is the right to "bodily integrity, to control one's person").
368. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
369. Id. at 724 (note, however, the Supreme Court rejected the citizens' argument and held that right
to assistance in committing suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process
Clause).
370. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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person."37' In reaffirming that a woman has a constitutionally protected interest in
terminating a pregnancy, the Court discussed the constitutional protection afforded
to personal decisions involving marriage, family relationships, and reproduction,
stating that such matters, involving "choices central to personal dignity and
autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. '372
These choices, as well as physical safety, are precisely what are at stake in
order for protection cases. 373 Individuals seeking protective orders will continue to
be at risk of losing physical liberty and personal freedom if they fail to obtain a
protective order.374 Many victims of domestic violence seek protective orders as a
last resort to reclaim "what the abuse has systematically stripped from them: their
control over their activities, their bodies, and their lives. '375 Research on domestic
violence patterns shows that "the struggle to control the woman ... lies at the heart
of battering. '376 Women seeking protective orders may even be risking their lives
in choosing to look to the courts for protection.3 77 Additionally, the rights to marry
and to divorce may be implicated in cases of domestic violence. 378  For some
women, seeking an order for protection is a signal that a marriage or relationship is
ending.379 Retaliatory violence by the abuser further threatens a domestic violence
victim's bodily integrity and personal autonomy. 380
The nature of the private interest at issue in protective order proceedings
encompasses both personal freedom and bodily integrity. If we take the Lassiter
case at face value and apply the notion that fundamental fairness requires the
appointment of counsel when physical liberty is at stake,38" ' then cases of domestic
violence meet that standard. When petitioners in domestic violence cases request
371. 505 U.S. at 915 (Stevens, J., concurring). See also Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497
U.S. 261, 287 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Our notions of liberty are inextricably entwined with
our idea of physical freedom and self-determination ... .
372. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
373. See Deborah Epstein et al., Transforming Aggressive Prosecution Policies: Prioritizing Victims'
Long-Term Safety in the Prosecution of Domestic Violence Cases, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y &
L. 465, 473-74 (stating that the physical health and abuse of women can influence their decision to
pursue convictions).
374. Id.
375. Fischer & Rose, supra note 60, at 423.
376. See Mahoney, supra note 22, at 55-56 (explaining battering as the perpetrator's attempt to
relegate the woman to a more traditional and subservient role). Cf Michelle R. Waul, Civil Protection
Orders: An Opportunity for Intervention with Domestic Violence Victims, 6 GEO. PUB. POL'y REv. 51,
56 (2000) (stating that some battered women seek civil protective orders because the process allows
them to take steps to regain control over their lives).
377. Deborah Epstein et al., Transforming Aggressive Prosecution Policies: Prioritizing Victims'
Long-Term Safety in the Prosecution of Domestic Violence Cases, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y &
L. 465, 476 (asserting that "at least 30% of all battered women who pursue legal action are reassaulted
during the process of prosecution").
378. See id. (claiming that domestic violence victims "are most likely to be killed while taking steps
to end the relationship with the abuser or while seeking help from the legal system").
379. Fischer & Rose, supra note 60, at 418.
380. See Caitlin E. Borgman, Note, Battered Women's Substantive Due Process Claims: Can Orders
of Protection Deflect DeShaney?, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1280, 1313 (1990) (stating that "It is at this stage
that battered women typically experience the most violent beatings, many of which result in their
deaths.").
381. Lassiter, 452 U.S. 18, 26-27 (1981).
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the protection of the court, they are petitioning the court to remedy their current
experience of violence and constraint, but they are also risking future deprivation of
liberty and continuing violence if they lose. 382
2. Familial Relationships Implicate the Due Process Clause
The United States Supreme Court case of Boddie v. Connecticut3 s3 provided a
framework for thinking about due process requirements pursuant to the Fourteenth
Amendment in a civil court proceeding when a familial relationship is at stake. As
previously noted, in Boddie a group of women who had been receiving welfare
assistance challenged the requirement that they pay court fees and service fees in
order to access the state court and proceed with an action for divorce. 83 The Court
held that the statutory scheme for creating and dissolving a marriage was state-
created.38 5 It found that the marriage relationship held a central place in society. 386
It also found that when state judicial action is crucial "to the adjustment of a
fundamental human relationship," denying access to the courts constitutes a
violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 387
Petitioners who request court intervention for protection from domestic abuse
are asking the court to aid in "the adjustment of a fundamental human
relationship." '388 In many instances the relationship to be adjusted involves
marriage 389 and issues of custody and parenting time with children.39  They are
accessing a state created remedy to provide safety and protection for themselves
and their families - a prime state function.391 The combination of the recognition
of the special status of familial relationships, the particular state responsibility to
protect its citizens from violence, and the state creation and operation of a forum to
attempt to provide safety from violence all support the conclusion that domestic
382. See PTACEK, supra note 51, at 74 (reporting that in a random study of 100 restraining order
files, women reported "being threatened with objects, had their hair pulled, were choked, spit at, and
kicked .... Nine percent of the women said that men either had threatened them with or had used
knives or guns .... [W]omen gave evidence of injuries, ranging from bruises and black eyes to broken
bones, facial cuts and swelling, a miscarriage and damaged eardrums.").
383. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
384. Id. at 372.
385. Id. at 383.
386. Id. at 374.
387. Id. at 382-83.
388. Id. at 383.
389. Marsha E. Wolf et al., Who Gets Protection Orders for Intimate Partner Violence?, 19 AM. J.
PREVENTIVE MED. 286, 288 (2000) (stating that female victims of domestic violence who obtained
protective orders were more likely to have had a marital relationship with the perpetrator than other
victims of domestic violence who did not obtain protective orders).
390. Id. at 289 (stating that women who had a protection order against their abuser were
"significantly more likely" to have children or stepchildren with the perpetrator than women without
such an order).
391. See Steven J. Heyman, The First Duty of Government: Protection, Liberty, and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 41 DuKE L.J. 507, 524 (1991) (stating, "The view that government was formed to protect
the life, liberty, and property of its citizens was fully shared by the Framers of the Federal Constitution.
As James Madison wrote in The Federalist, the 'protection' of 'the faculties of men' . . . 'is the first
object of government."') (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison)).
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violence victims should be entitled to appointed counsel in protective order
proceedings.
B. The Gendered Nature of Domestic Violence and Gender Bias in the Courts
Lead to a Heightened Risk of Erroneous Decisions
Research confirms that women are the overwhelming majority of victims of
domestic violence 392 In 2001, eighty-five percent of the victims of intimate partner
violence were women.3 93 In another study, women were 91.9 percent of the victims
of domestic violence by men while only 14.2 percent of the victims were men
assaulted by women. 94 In 1998, women were victims in about 876,340 violent
crimes at the hands of an intimate partner, whereas men were victims in about
157,330 violent crimes by an intimate partner.3 95  Moreover, women were
victimized by intimate partners at a substantially greater rate than men.3 96 In 1998,
intimate partner homicides accounted for about eleven percent of all murders
nationwide. 397 Of these, seventy-two percent of the victims were women. 398 In the
same year, intimate partner homicides comprised approximately thirty-three
percent of all murders of women, but only four percent of the murders of men.399
Other researchers have also concluded that the behavior of men and women with
regard to severe violence against an intimate partner is different and simply
comparing rates does not give a complete picture of domestic violence
victimization. 4m These researchers found:
Men often hunt down and kill spouses who have left them;
women hardly ever behave similarly. Men kill wives as part of
planned murder-suicides; analogous acts by women are almost
unheard of. Men kill in response to revelations of wifely
infidelity; women almost never respond similarly, although their
mates are more often adulterous. Men often kill wives after
subjecting them to lengthy periods of coercive abuse and
392. SHANNAN M. CATALANO, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CRIME
DATA BRIEF: INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE, 1993-2001 1-3 (2003), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjspub/pdf/ipvO1.pdf.
393. Id.
394. TJADEN & THOENNES, supra note 15, at 46-47.
395. CALLE MARIE RENNISON & SARAH WELCHANS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT: INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE 3 (2000), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ipv.pdf.
396. SHANNAN M. CATALANO, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NATIONAL
CRIME VICTIMIZATION SURVEY: CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION 9 (2003), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjslpub/pdf/cv03.pdf (finding that 19% of the violent crime against women
was committed by an intimate partner while intimate partners committed 3% of the violent crime against
men).
397. RENNISON & WELCHANS, supra note 395, at 2.
398. Id.
399. Id.
400. See Margo I. Wilson & Martin Daly, Who Kills Whom in Spouse Killings? On the Exceptional
Sex Ratio of Spousal Homicides in the United States, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 189, 206 (1992) (revealing that
numerical equivalence does not convey the asymmetry between the actions or motives of male and
female perpetrators).
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assaults; the roles in such cases are seldom if ever reversed ....
Moreover, it seems clear that a large proportion of the spousal
killings perpetrated by wives, but almost none of those
perpetrated by husbands, are acts of self-defense. Unlike men,
women kill male partners after years of suffering physical
violence, after they have exhausted all available sources of
assistance, when they feel trapped, and because they fear for their
own lives 4 1
In the last several years some have asserted that women are as violent as men,
and that men are just as victimized as women. 02 However, simply relying on
prevalence rates is misleading 0 3 A critique of the studies that make such claims
reveals that these studies have various inadequacies. 4 Most of the studies do not
include sexual abuse statistics, and many of them leave out violence that occurs
between separated or divorced couplesY' 5 The studies also "fail to include three
important variables: the motives of each partner, the rates of initiation of violence
by each partner in the relationship and in particular episodes, and the physical and
psychological consequences of the violence to each partner.' '40 6 When those factors
are considered, women are found to be the primary victims of partner violence. 407
These findings do not mean women never use violence. Rather, it means that when
women do use violence it is more likely to be used in self-defensei 0t Further, the
assertion that women initiate violence as frequently as men do is inaccurate
"because it is based on speculation or inadequate research . . . ."409 Additionally,
the physical and psychological harms that are the result of domestic violence are
generally greater for women than for men.4 10  Because women are more
psychologically and physically injured than men by the violence inflicted by their
401. Id.
402. See, e.g., Robert L. McNeely & Gloria Robinson-Simpson, The Truth About Domestic Violence:
A Falsely Framed Issue, 32 SOC. WORK 485, 485-87 (1987) (citing studies that show women are as
likely as men to select and initiate physical violence to resolve marital conflicts and that men and
women have similar intentions when using physical violence); Suzanne K. Steinmetz, The Battered
Husband Syndrome, 2 VICTIMOLOGY 499, 499, 501-06 (1978) (noting that husband abuse is not
uncommon, although many tend to ignore it, dismiss it or treat it with "selective inattention").
403. See Daniel G. Saunders, Are Physical Assaults by Wives and Girlfriends a Major Social
Problem? A Review of the Literature, 8 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1424, 1428-29 (2002) (stating that
rates of victimization in some studies are deceptive because they fail to account for certain variables).
404. Id. at 1435 (informing that gender differences in prevalence rates may be explained by
"methodological problems, which include: speculative conclusions, using ambiguous questions,
reporting only minor forms of violence, and using the terms mutual combat or reciprocal violence when
all that is known is that both partners have been violent at some point in the past").
405. Id. at 1429-30 (finding that studies show that the rates of sexual abuse of women by their
partners were 20 times higher in a random survey of the U.S. population and that a higher percentage of
women than men are physically abused, harassed, and stalked after the relationship ends).
406. Id. at 1427.
407. See id.
408. Id. at 1431-34.
409. Saunders, supra note 403, at 1441. The literature review conducted by Professor Saunders also
found that many studies show a higher rate of violence directed at female partners and that these studies
tend to be police and crime studies that involve the most injurious forms of violence. Id.
410. Id. at 1436.
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partners, they generally require more resources and services than men to escape
abusive relationships. 41  Additionally, the vast majority of persons petitioning the
courts for protective orders are women and the majority of respondents are male.4" 2
The overwhelming statistical disparity between women who experience domestic
violence inflicted by their intimate male partner and men who experience violence
inflicted by their female partners, as well as gender differences in initiation, motive,
and consequences, suggests that domestic violence supports and is supported by
gender bias.
Identified risk factors associated with domestic violence also support the
premise that gender-based bias motivates domestic violence directed at female
intimate partners. 41 3 For example, studies show that the "strongest risk factor for
being a victim of partner violence is being female. '414 Additional risk factors that
make violence against females more likely include belief in the traditional gender
stereotypes and acceptance of the concept of men's superiority and entitlement to
control the family. 41 5 Many batterers' use of violence to exercise power and control
over their partners is motivated by "stereotypical sex-role expectations for 'their'
women." 416 Traditional gender roles play an important part in men's and women's
acceptance and use of violence.41 7 Gender role stereotypes encourage men to feel
411. See K. Daniel O'Leary et al., Assessment and Treatment of Partner Abuse: A Synopsis for the
Legal Profession, 58 ALB. L. REV. 1215, 1228 (1995) (noting the greater impact of both physical and
psychological aggression by men on women than vice versa); Emily J. Sack, Battered Women and the
State: The Struggle for the Future of Domestic Violence Policy, 2004 WiS. L. REV. 1657, 1734-35
(noting the tremendous need for services for victims of domestic violence and that if victims receive
economic assistance to facilitate independence, more victims will be able to gain safety); Erin L. Han,
Note, Mandatory Arrest and No-Drop Policies: Victim Empowerment in Domestic Violence Cases, 23
B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 159, 166 (2003) ("Given the complexity of the reasons why a battered woman
might stay with her abuser, disentangling a victim from her situation is not as simple as picking her up
and carrying her to safety.").
412. See Steve Basile, Comparison of Abuse Alleged by Same- and Opposite-Gender Litigants as
Cited in Requests for Abuse Prevention Orders, 19 J. FAM. VIOL. 59, 62 (2004) (finding that a 1997
Massachusetts study showed that 81% of plaintiffs were female and 78% of defendants were male);
Outar, supra note 3, at 3 (finding that 89% of petitioners were female and 87% of respondents were
male in a study of 300 order for protection cases); See also JENNIFER MEADE & ALLISON L. TASSIE,
COMMW. OF MASS. GOVERNOR'S COMM'N ON SEXUAL & DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, SUMMARIES OF
STATEWIDE DATA SOURCES RELEVANT TO SEXUAL AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, AND CHILD SEXUAL
ABUSE: A REPORT OF THE DATA ANALYSIS, RESEARCH, AND EVALUATION COMMITTEE (2005)
(reporting that 82% of restraining orders in Massachusetts are taken out against men, 94% of which are
abuse prevention orders); Susan B. Sorenson & Haikang Shen, Restraining Orders in California: A Look
at Statewide Data, II VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, 912, 912 (2005) (reporting that 72.2% of
California's 227,941 active restraining orders in 2003 were filed by women with the purpose of
restraining men).
413. See AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS'N, VIOLENCE AND THE FAMILY: REPORT OF THE AMERICAN
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON VIOLENCE AND THE FAMILY 18-20
(1996) (listing various risk factors that contribute to family violence).
414. Id. at 19.
415. Id. at 18, 19. Other factors include exposure to parental violence, alcohol and drug abuse, high
levels of anger, poverty, guns in the home, acceptance of marital fighting, and violence in the culture.
Id. at 18.
416. Id. at 82.
417. Id. at 112.
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entitled to control the behavior of their female partners. 418 This kind of gender role
socialization "contributes significantly to men's continued use of violence to
maintain power and control.
419
Additional studies that show that one of the primary precipitating factors
leading to domestic violence is a challenge by the woman to the man's authority
and that domestic violence is motivated by the need to enforce a stereotypical view
of women's proper place and the gendered belief in entitlement to control. 42 The
challenge can be over caring for the children, spending of money, or questioning
certain behavior of her partner, often his drug or alcohol use.4 21 More generally,
violence occurs when the woman defies her partner and refuses to comply with
something she is told to do by her partner.
422
It is not just that women are disproportionately the targets of domestic
violence, suffer more injuries, and, therefore, are treated differently than men. By
reinforcing the subordinate status of women, the policing of gender boundaries by
use of violence has negative consequences for all women.4 23 The use of violence to
impose conformance to gendered roles and expectations affects all women because
within the historical context of women's subordination it is a signal of the
continuing dominance of men and of men's perceived entitlement to control
women.
424
In looking for intervention from the court by petitioning for a protective order,
victims seek to have the state vindicate their right to freedom, bodily integrity and
safety, and they are doing so in a forum that studies by state task forces on gender
bias and the courts have shown is generally discriminatory toward women.4 25 The
418. Id. at 18, 112.
419. AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS'N, supra note 413, at 112.
420. See PTACEK, supra note 51, at 90.
421. Id. at 78-89.
422. Id. at 88.
423. See Sarah M. Buel, Effective Assistance of Counsel for Battered Women Defendants: A
Normative Construct, 26 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 217 (2003) (suggesting that domestic violence is situated
within the context of inequality that impacts women's fundamental rights of freedom, choice and
autonomy); Deborah M. Goelman, Shelter from the Storm: Using Jurisdictional Statutes to Protect
Victims of Domestic Violence after the Violence Against Women Act of 2000, 13 COLUM. J. GENDER &
L. 101 (arguing that for battered women the fundamental right to liberty and right to raise children are at
stake); Elizabeth Schneider, Battered Women and Feminist Lawmaking, 23 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 243
(2002) (describing how feminists in the 19th century argued that violence against women, women's
equality, and women's citizenship were inextricably linked).
424. Domestic violence is not exclusively confined to men battering women. As noted previously,
some women use violence against their male partners. See supra notes 402-411 and accompanying text.
Also, some gay men and lesbians use violence against their gay or lesbian partners. See, e.g., DAVID
ISLAND & PATRICK LETELLIER, MEN WHO BEAT THE MEN WHO LOVE THEM: BATTERED GAY MEN
AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 7-9 (1991) (explaining that gay men's domestic violence is prevalent but that
statistics are hard to find); CLAIRE M. RENZE'rrt, VIOLENT BETRAYAL: PARTNER ABUSE IN LESBIAN
RELATIONSHIPS 17-19 (1992) (illustrating the prevalence of domestic violence in lesbian relationships).
This does not change the analysis of whether male battering of women supports and is supported by
gender inequality.
425. See, e.g., Leigh Goodmark, Telling Stories, Saving Lives: The Battered Mothers' Testimony
Project, Women's Narratives, and Court Reform, 37 ARtZ. ST. L.J. 709, 745 (2005) (describing bias in
Massachusetts court system); Missouri Task Force on Gender and Justice, Report of the Missouri Task
Force on Gender and Justice, 58 Mo. L. REV. 485 (1993) (describing bias in Missouri court system);
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE MATTERSSummer 20061
TEMPLE POLITICAL & CIVIL RIGHTS LAW REVIEW
intertwining of the gendered nature of domestic violence, which reinforces
traditional gender roles, and the structural bias of the court system itself means that
there is a high likelihood of erroneous determinations in domestic violence cases.
Not only are petitioners facing the usual complexities of navigating the court
system without an attorney, but they are also confronted with a system in which
there is embedded gender inequality both in the substantive issues brought before
the court for decision, and in the forum in which the determination takes place.
C. State Interest at Stake
Due to the seriousness of the issues before the court in protective order
proceedings, both the state and the parties, have a substantial interest in seeing that
decisions are correct and are arrived at through a fair and valid process. Protective
orders can involve not only issues of safety for petitioners and their children who
are at risk of physical harm, but also complex issues of custody, parenting time,
support, and property division.426  Decisions affecting these issues can help to
ensure the petitioner's safety or put her and her children at further risk.4 27 The
court must sort through conflicting factual claims and make sensitive
determinations with respect to the safety of children.4 28 If custody is at issue there
may be testimony from competing experts. 429 Given the complexity of the issues
and the potentially high costs if mistakes are made, the state has an interest in
providing a process and forum that maximizes fairness and the possibility that the
full facts and issues will be brought before the court.
The state also has an interest in having its citizens respect the dispute
resolution process it creates. 430 The basis for the willingness of citizens to engage
in the ordered resolution of disputes is based on the belief in the fairness of the
process. 431 At the core of a democratic society is a process for resolving disputes
REPORT OF THE NEW YORK TASK FORCE ON WOMEN IN THE COURTS (1986), reprinted in 15 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 11 (1986-87) (describing bias in New York court system).
426. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01(6) (West 2004) (Minnesota's Domestic Abuse Act
describes the various forms of relief the court can grant in protective order cases, including custody,
property, and support regulations).
427. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01(6)(a)(4) (allowing the court to restrict parenting time when
the spouse and children are at risk)
428. See id. (Court determination of parenting time can lead to dangerous situations if the child is left
with an abusive or dangerous parent).
429. See, e.g., Joseph P.B. v. Margaret O'D., 161 A.D.2d 545, 556 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (referring
to expert testimony on child custody in proceeding in which mother obtained order for protection); Mary
Beck, Spotlight: Response to Violence against Women at the University of Missouri at Columbia, 23 ST.
Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 227, 243-44 (2004) (describing protective order in case involving expert
witnesses on custody).
430. See Robert W. Sweet, Civil Gideon in a Just Society, 17 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 503, 506 (1998)
("[S]ociety's paramount interest must be in a just determination of a person's fundamental rights and
privileges. While there will undoubtedly be a cost to providing counsel to impoverished litigants,
erosion of faith in the judicial system would exact an even higher price."); Tom R. Tyler, Procedural
Justice, Legitimacy and the Effective Rule of Law, 30 CRIME & JUST. 283, 344 (2003) (arguing that
"People's willingness to cooperate with groups is generally facilitated by their judgments that the group
functions using fair procedures.").
431. Id.
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that is regularized and just.432 "Without such a 'legal system,' social organization
and cohesion are virtually impossible; with the ability to seek regularized resolution
of conflicts individuals are capable of interdependent action that enables them to
strive for achievements without the anxieties that would beset them in a
disorganized society. ' 433 Thus the state's interest in both minimizing the possibility
of an erroneous outcome and ensuring its citizens' confidence in the ordered and
just resolution of disputes weighs in favor of the appointment of counsel in
protective order proceedings.
In Lassiter the Supreme Court recognized two aspects to the state's interest.
434
First the state had an interest, as did the parent, in an accurate and just decision.435
This interest coincided with the parent's interest in having appointed counsel.
436
Second, however, the Court acknowledged that the state had an interest in avoiding
the additional cost of appointed counsel and longer hearings.437 This pecuniary
interest of the state would militate against the appointment of counsel.438 However,
while financial cost is a factor to be weighed in determining the required procedural
safeguards pursuant to the Due Process Clause, "financial cost alone is not a
controlling weight in determining whether due process requires a particular
procedural safeguard.1439 The Lassiter Court admitted that the state's pecuniary
interest was not significant enough to outweigh the important familial interests at
stake in a termination proceeding. 44
The state's interest in not expending resources for appointed counsel in
protective order cases does not override the significant interests of the parties in
having a fair and just process to resolve a violent dispute that puts victims and
children at risk of serious harm.441 The potential costs involved in adequately
providing counsel in civil legal matters to indigent clients, as best as can be
determined, are not excessive.442 In protective order proceedings, the parties'
432. Boddie, 401 U.S. at 374-76.
433. Id. at 374.
434. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27-28.
435. Id. at 27.
436. Id. at 27-28.
437. Id. at 28.
438. Id.
439. Matthews, 424 U.S. at 348.
440. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 28.
441. See id. at 27-28.
442. California Appeals Court Judge and special advisor to the ABA Task Force on Access to Civil
Justice, Earl Johnson Jr., studied the provision of civil legal services internationally and concluded that
from figures available in the 1990s, the least generous countries, France and Germany, spent 2.5 times
more of their gross national product than the United States. The United States, combining state, federal,
local and IOLTA contributions spends approximately $600 million on civil legal services annually for
the poor. England spent 17 times more of its GNP than the United States. If the United States were to
meet the French and German commitment, we would be spending approximately $1.6 billion annually.
If we matched England's commitment we would spend approximately $10 billion. Justice Earl Johnson,
Jr., Equal Access to Justice: Comparing Access to Justice in the United States and Other Industrial
Democracies, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. S83, S84 (2000). See also Michael S. Greco, Fulfilling the
Promise of Equal Justice for All, 7 LAWYERS J. 3A (Oct. 14, 2005) (citing Johnson study finding that the
United States spends less than other countries on provision of legal services). Mary Deutsch Schneider,
Trumpeting Civil Gideon: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?, 4 BENCH & BAR OF MINN. 22, 23 (2006)
(stating that federal funding for the Legal Services Corporation for fiscal year 2005 was originally
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interest in a fair process to protect victims and children from harm, the
regularization of familial relationships, and in obtaining a resolution that is
appropriate and just trumps the state's pecuniary interest.
CONCLUSION
Although it might be easy to grasp the monetary cost of implementing a right
to counsel in protective order proceedings, the failure to provide counsel is not
costless. It is a significant cost born by individuals, families and society as a
whole. When victims of violence express faith that the court system will protect
them and their children, they are expressing a belief in a basic expectation of
government. They are also expressing faith in the fundamental fairness of the
judicial system to provide an enforceable resolution to a potentially life-threatening
conflict. Even applying the cramped jurisprudence of state action doctrine as
articulated by the United State Supreme Court, civil protective order proceedings
come within the Lugar/Edmonson analytical framework so that due process
considerations apply. Given the fundamental private interests at stake and the risk
of harm within the context of violent familial relationships, the Mathews factors
support finding a right to appointed counsel in these cases.
If the ideals of democracy and the rule of law are to have meaning, they must
apply to the very least of us. At present, the promise of equality before the law
remains unfulfilled. Separate justice for the rich and poor results in unequal access
and outcomes. Appointment of counsel in civil protective orders is a beginning
step to achieve the promise of justice for all.
$335.3 million which was then reduced to $330.8 million); Central Intelligence Agency, World
Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/cialpublications/factbooklgeos/us.html#Econ (last visited Dec. 22, 2006)
(stating that the total federal budget expenditures in 2005 were $2.466 trillion).
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